False mental-state attribution in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

这个项目是一个跨越多个学科的更大研究项目的关键部分，该项目已经进行了40多年：拼凑人类心理理论的起源。心理理论是将内部心理状态归因于他人并在此基础上预测他人行为的能力。人类从小就善于对他人的感知、感觉、想要、知道和意图做出判断。然而，尽管进行了几十年的研究，但我们最接近的灵长类近亲黑猩猩是否具有这种能力仍然是一个激烈辩论的问题。一些研究人员声称，有足够的证据可以得出结论，黑猩猩可以将感知、欲望、意图和知识归因于他人，但它们无法推断出与现实不符的精神状态(例如，错误的信念)。其他人认为，这一结论还为时过早，原因有两个：(1)猿类推断其他类型错误心理状态(如错误感知)的能力尚未得到测试；(2)一些测试的阳性结果可以给出更简单的解释：猿类本可以通过使用行为或环境线索，而不考虑另一个人的心理状态。这是由于一个普遍存在的方法论问题，这个问题贯穿了迄今为止在这一领域进行的所有研究，称为波维内利问题。我的研究旨在通过使用一种克服波维内利问题的新方法来测试类人猿的错误知觉归因，来解决上面列出的两个问题。黑猩猩将被分配任务，在无法使用行为或环境线索的情况下，它们必须通过对另一个人的精神状态进行推断来预测另一个人的行为。任何努力了解人类社会认知能力进化根源的人都会对这项研究结果感兴趣。我的研究也有可能解决该领域长期存在的方法论问题，从而在类人猿心理理论的主题上达成更大的共识。**

This project is a crucial piece of a larger research program spanning several disciplines that has been underway for over four decades: to piece together the origins of human theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute internal, mental states to others and to predict their behavior on that basis. Humans become adept at making judgments about what others perceive, feel, want, know, and intend from an early age. However, despite decades of research, whether our closest primate relatives, chimpanzees, share this ability is still a hotly debated issue. Some researchers claim there is enough evidence to conclude that chimpanzees can attribute perceptions, desires, intentions, and knowledge to others, but they are not able to infer mental states that are at odds with reality (e.g., false beliefs). Others argue that this conclusion is highly premature for two reasons: (1) the apes' ability to infer other types of false mental states (e.g., false perceptions) have not yet been tested; and (2) the positive results from some tests can be given simpler explanations: apes could have passed by using behavioral or environmental cues, without ever considering the mental state of the other individual. This is due to a pervasive methodological problem that cuts across all research carried out to date in this area, called Povinelli's Problem. My research aims to address the two issues listed above by testing false perception attribution in apes using a novel method that overcomes Povinelli's Problem. Chimpanzees will be given tasks in which they must predict another individual's behavior by making inferences about their mental state, in a situation that makes it impossible for them to use behavioral or environmental cues. The results will be of interest to anyone who strives to understand the evolutionary roots of our own social cognitive abilities. My research also has the potential to solve a longstanding methodological problem in the field and thus lead to greater consensus on the subject of ape theory of mind.**