Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of counterfactuals
Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of counterfactuals
复制标题
反事实先行虚假性和反事实的认知敏感性
DOI:
10.1007/s11098-017-0855-z
复制
发表时间:
2018
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Why do utterances of counterfactual conditionals typically, but not universally, convey the message that their antecedents are false? I demonstrate that two common theoretical commitments–commitment to the existence ofscalar implicatureand ofinformative presupposition—can be supplemented with an independently motivated theory of the presuppositions of competing conditional alternatives to jointly predict this information when and only when it appears. The view works best if indicative and counterfactual conditionals have a closely related semantics, so I conclude by undermining two familiar arguments for a nonunified semantics of indicative and counterfactual conditionals.
登录
查看更多内容
影响因子:
0.5
作者:
Robert Stalnaker
通讯作者:
Robert Stalnaker
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1950
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
P. Strawson
通讯作者:
P. Strawson
影响因子:
1.1
作者:
P. Schlenker
通讯作者:
P. Schlenker
影响因子:
0.5
作者:
Janell Watson
通讯作者:
Janell Watson
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2008
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
D. Edgington
通讯作者:
D. Edgington