Selective enforcement of regulation
Selective enforcement of regulation
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有选择地执行监管
DOI：
10.1016/j.cjar.2011.04.002
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发表时间：
2011-06
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
王芳萍
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
蒋德权;陈冬华;王芳萍
无论是在既定规则之外，还是在其自由裁量权范围内，监管机构都可能偏离为执行规则而设定的最初目标或原则，我们称之为选择性执行。本文以转型期国家中国为例，运用案例和大样本检验的方法，提供了选择性执法的经验证据。结果显示，中国证券监督管理委员会(证监会)在调查和处罚违规行为时，会考虑违规公司是否具有国有背景以及该背景的力度。在控制了违规程度后，国有企业(SOE)受到的惩罚比私营企业轻；而且国有企业的等级越高，处罚越轻。国有企业也需要更长时间才能受到惩罚。我们还发现，违反规则不那么严重的公司比违反规则更严重的公司申请再融资的倾向更大。这可能是因为违规的严重程度会影响上市公司获得再融资的预期。这项研究的分析和结论有助于理解转型经济体选择性强制执行的原因和后果。
Regulatory agencies may, whether outside of set rules or within their discretion, depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules, which we term selective enforcement. Taking China, a country in transition, as an example, and using cases and large-sample tests, we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement. The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance. After controlling for the degree of violation, state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies; and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question, the less severe the punishment. It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished. We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously. This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies’ expectations of obtaining refinancing. The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.
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DOI：
--
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
The Economist
影响因子：
--
作者：
Yang Dan
通讯作者：
Yang Dan
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
G. Stigler
通讯作者：
G. Stigler
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.558021
发表时间：
2009-04
期刊：
International Corporate Finance eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
Utpal Bhattacharya;H. Daouk
通讯作者：
Utpal Bhattacharya;H. Daouk
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00398.x
发表时间：
2005-01
期刊：
Corporate Finance: Governance
影响因子：
--
作者：
Katharina Pistor;Chenggang Xu
通讯作者：
Katharina Pistor;Chenggang Xu
DOI：
10.1080/01972240309458
发表时间：
2003-04
期刊：
The Information Society
影响因子：
--
作者：
Krishna P. Jayakar
通讯作者：
Krishna P. Jayakar