Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection

Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection
复制标题

非规范逻辑多元主义和规范性反对的报复

DOI:
10.1093/pq/pqz040
复制
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
The Philosophical Quarterly
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
--
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:

文献摘要

参考文献

被引文献

相似文献

逻辑多元化是一种认为存在不止一个正确逻辑的观点。大多数逻辑多元论者认为,逻辑是规范的,因为如果你接受一个有效论点的前提,但拒绝它的结论,你就会犯错误。一些作者认为这种组合是自我破坏的:假设除了从Γ到ϕ的论点在中有效但在中无效之外,两者都是正确的逻辑。如果你接受Γ中的所有句子,那么,根据规范性,如果你拒绝ϕ,你就犯了一个错误。为了避免错误,你应该接受ϕ或暂停对ϕ的判断。这两种选择对多元化来说都是有问题的。多元论者能够通过拒绝逻辑的规范性来避免这种担忧吗?我认为他们做不到。在其他条件相同的情况下,即使逻辑不规范,论点也会通过。
Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose thatandare correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to ϕ, which is valid inbut invalid in. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject ϕ. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept ϕ or suspend judgment about ϕ. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.
竞争、规范性和逻辑多元主义的崩溃
DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2017.1327370
发表时间: 2017
期刊: Inquiry
影响因子: 1.3
作者:
Erik Stei
通讯作者: Erik Stei
评论:Alfred Tarski,《Uber den Begriff der Logischen Folgerung》
DOI: --
发表时间: 1937
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
W. V. Quine
通讯作者: W. V. Quine
拯救信仰规范主义
DOI: --
发表时间: 2012
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
R. Olinder
通讯作者: R. Olinder
逻辑多元主义的崩溃被过分夸大了
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9841-7
发表时间: 2017
期刊: Erkenntnis
影响因子: 0.9
作者:
Colin R. Caret
通讯作者: Colin R. Caret
偏差与罪恶:作为逻辑认识论中的理论美德的力量
DOI: --
发表时间: 2019
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
Gillian Russell
通讯作者: Gillian Russell