Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection
Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection
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非规范逻辑多元主义和规范性反对的报复
DOI:
10.1093/pq/pqz040
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发表时间:
2020
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Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose thatandare correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to ϕ, which is valid inbut invalid in. If you accept all sentences in Γ, then, by normativity, you make a mistake if you reject ϕ. In order to avoid mistakes, you should accept ϕ or suspend judgment about ϕ. Both options are problematic for pluralism. Can pluralists avoid this worry by rejecting the normativity of logic? I argue that they cannot. All else being equal, the argument goes through even if logic is not normative.
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影响因子:
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Erik Stei
DOI:
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1937
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W. V. Quine
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W. V. Quine
DOI:
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Colin R. Caret
DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
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作者:
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Gillian Russell