Individual variation evades the prisoner's dilemma.
Individual variation evades the prisoner's dilemma.
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DOI：
10.1186/1471-2148-2-15
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发表时间：
2002-09-10
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Bell, Josh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johnson, Dominic D. P.;Stopka, Pavel;Bell, Josh
囚徒困境（PD）是一种广泛用于研究进化生物学合作的范式，也广泛用于道德哲学、社会学、经济学和政治学等领域。玩家通常被假设为采用某些策略有固定的收益，这些策略只取决于对手所采用的策略。然而，固定收益在本质上是不现实的。效用函数和追求某些策略的相关收益在具有许多因素的群体成员中各不相同。在生物学中，这些因素包括大小、年龄、社会地位和预期寿命;在经济学中，这些因素包括社会经济地位、个人偏好和过去的经验;在政治学中，这些因素包括意识形态、政治利益和公众支持。因此，对于任何两个不同的参与者来说，没有一个结果是相同的。我们表明，放松固定收益的假设导致经常违反的囚徒困境所需的收益结构。例如，在线性PD矩阵中，方差是收益区间的两倍，只有16%的矩阵是有效的。一个缺乏有效PD矩阵的参与人破坏了囚徒困境的条件，因此在任何两个参与人之间，PD博弈本身仍然更少（在这种情况下为3%）。这也许可以解释为什么囚徒困境在自然界中几乎没有被发现，尽管它在合作进化的研究中一直是一个普遍存在的（并且仍然具有指导意义的）模型。
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a widely used paradigm to study cooperation in evolutionary biology, as well as in fields as diverse as moral philosophy, sociology, economics and politics. Players are typically assumed to have fixed payoffs for adopting certain strategies, which depend only on the strategy played by the opponent. However, fixed payoffs are not realistic in nature. Utility functions and the associated payoffs from pursuing certain strategies vary among members of a population with numerous factors. In biology such factors include size, age, social status and expected life span; in economics they include socio-economic status, personal preference and past experience; and in politics they include ideology, political interests and public support. Thus, no outcome is identical for any two different players. We show that relaxing the assumption of fixed payoffs leads to frequent violations of the payoff structure required for a Prisoner's Dilemma. With variance twice the payoff interval in a linear PD matrix, for example, only 16% of matrices are valid. A single player lacking a valid PD matrix destroys the conditions for a Prisoner's Dilemma, so between any two players, PD games themselves are fewer still (3% in this case). This may explain why the Prisoner's Dilemma has hardly been found in nature, despite the fact that it has served as a ubiquitous (and still instructive) model in studies of the evolution of cooperation.
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影响因子：
3.5
作者：
Boone, C;De Brabander, B;van Witteloostuijn, A
通讯作者：
van Witteloostuijn, A
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作者：
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通讯作者：
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影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
SIGMUND, K