Exploitative leaders incite intergroup warfare in a social mammal.
Exploitative leaders incite intergroup warfare in a social mammal.
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.2003745117
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发表时间：
2020-11-24
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Thompson FJ
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johnstone RA;Cant MA;Cram D;Thompson FJ
对于人类社会中复杂战争的普遍存在，一个经典的解释是剥削性个人的领导，他们从冲突中获益，同时避免代价。在这里，我们扩展了经典的鹰鸽模型，以表明这种领导也可以解释某些动物社会中严重的集体暴力的演变。我们使用来自野生带状猫鼬的长期数据来测试我们的模型，并表明女性领导人煽动与竞争对手群体的战斗以获得遗传利益，而男性则承担战斗的代价。其结果是群体间暴力的程度异常严重。我们的研究结果表明，领导者与他们所煽动的成本脱钩，放大了群体间冲突的破坏性。人类之间的集体冲突很普遍，尽管往往具有高度的破坏性。对这种战争在某些人类社会中盛行的一个经典解释是，由自私自利的个人领导，他们从冲突中获益，而其他社会成员则付出代价。在这里，我们表明，这种领导也可以解释某些动物社会中集体暴力的演变。我们首先扩展了经典的鹰鸽模型的进化的动物侵略考虑的情况下，在每个群体中的一个子集的个人可能会发起战斗，所有的群体成员都参与其中。我们表明，这种领导，当结合不平等的战斗的回报，可以导致严重的群体间的侵略的演变，人口的平均健身的负面后果。我们测试我们的模型，使用长期数据从野生带状猫鼬，一个物种的特点是频繁的组间冲突，有非常不同的健身后果的男性和女性组成员。数据表明，群体之间的侵略性遭遇发起的女性，谁获得健身的好处，在战斗中与群外男性交配，而战斗的成本主要由男性承担。与模型预测一致，结果是群体间暴力异常严重。我们的研究结果表明，领导者与他们所煽动的成本脱钩，放大了群体间冲突的破坏性。
A classic explanation for the prevalence of complex warfare in human societies is leadership by exploitative individuals who reap the benefits of conflict while avoiding the costs. Here, we extend the classic hawk−dove model to show that leadership of this kind can also explain the evolution of severe collective violence in certain animal societies. We test our model using long-term data from wild banded mongooses, and show that female leaders incite fights with rival groups to gain genetic benefits, while males bear the costs of fighting. The result is unusually severe levels of intergroup violence. Our findings suggest that the decoupling of leaders from the costs that they incite amplifies the destructive nature of intergroup conflict. Collective conflicts among humans are widespread, although often highly destructive. A classic explanation for the prevalence of such warfare in some human societies is leadership by self-serving individuals that reap the benefits of conflict while other members of society pay the costs. Here, we show that leadership of this kind can also explain the evolution of collective violence in certain animal societies. We first extend the classic hawk−dove model of the evolution of animal aggression to consider cases in which a subset of individuals within each group may initiate fights in which all group members become involved. We show that leadership of this kind, when combined with inequalities in the payoffs of fighting, can lead to the evolution of severe intergroup aggression, with negative consequences for population mean fitness. We test our model using long-term data from wild banded mongooses, a species characterized by frequent intergroup conflicts that have very different fitness consequences for male and female group members. The data show that aggressive encounters between groups are initiated by females, who gain fitness benefits from mating with extragroup males in the midst of battle, whereas the costs of fighting are borne chiefly by males. In line with the model predictions, the result is unusually severe levels of intergroup violence. Our findings suggest that the decoupling of leaders from the costs that they incite amplifies the destructive nature of intergroup conflict.
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作者：
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通讯作者：
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DOI：
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