Daring dishonesty: On the role of sanctions for (un)ethical behavior
Daring dishonesty: On the role of sanctions for (un)ethical behavior
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大胆的不诚实行为：论制裁（不）道德行为的作用
DOI：
10.1016/j.jesp.2018.06.009
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Hilbig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thielmann;Hilbig
根据以功利为基础的违反规范和不道德行为的开创性理论，撒谎的决定涉及到在不诚实的潜在好处与被发现的潜在代价之间进行权衡。然而，即使在零制裁风险的范例中，个人也不会始终如一地作弊。更引人注目的是，从实施制裁系统的研究中获得的为数不多的发现中，大多数都与基于不诚实的公用事业描述的预期背道而驰，这些发现表明，与零风险相比，当有很小的制裁风险时，作弊行为会增加。鉴于这些发现的惊人性质，以及相应证据的普遍匮乏，我们设计了一项针对不诚实行为的制裁作用的有针对性的实证测试。具体地说，在两个实验中，我们操纵了作弊范式中一个人的反应的事实真相被检查的概率(即16.7%对50%)。在实验2中，我们进一步改变了对被发现作弊的惩罚的严厉程度。结果表明，随着被抓几率的增加以及制裁力度的加大，撒谎的意愿明显下降。因此，结果清楚地支持了外部成本影响不道德行为的理论概念，其方向是基于效用的模型所隐含的方向。
According to seminal utility-based theories of norm-violating and unethical behavior, the decision to lie involves trading-off the potential benefits of dishonesty against the potential costs if caught. However, even in paradigms with zero risk of sanctions, individuals do not consistently cheat. Still more strikingly, most of the few findings available from studies implementing a sanctioning system run contrary to what would be expected based on utility-based accounts of dishonesty, showing increased cheating when there is a small risk of sanctions as compared to when the risk is zero. Given the striking nature of these findings and the general scarcity of corresponding evidence, we devised a targeted empirical test of the role of sanctions for dishonest behavior. Specifically, in two experiments, we manipulated the probability (i.e., 16.7% vs. 50%) that the factual truth of one's response in a cheating paradigm is checked. In Experiment 2, we further varied the severity of sanctions for being caught cheating. Results showed that the willingness to lie strongly decreased with increasing probability of being caught as well as with increasing severity of sanctions. As such, the results clearly support the theoretical notion that external costs influence unethical behavior, in the direction implied by utility-based models.
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影响因子：
7.6
作者：
Jones, Daniel N.;Paulhus, Delroy L.
通讯作者：
Paulhus, Delroy L.
影响因子：
3.4
作者：
Hilbig, Benjamin E.;Thielmann, Isabel
通讯作者：
Thielmann, Isabel
监控和制裁对作弊的影响：来自突尼斯的实验证据
影响因子：
2.2
作者：
Insaf Bekir;S. Harbi;G. Grolleau;Naoufel Mzoughi;A. Sutan
通讯作者：
A. Sutan
影响因子：
--
作者：
Gelman, Andrew;Weakliem, David
通讯作者：
Weakliem, David
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Pittarello, Andrea;Leib, Margarita;Shalvi, Shaul
通讯作者：
Shalvi, Shaul