Tractable Compensation Plan under Asymmetric Information
Tractable Compensation Plan under Asymmetric Information
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信息不对称下易于处理的薪酬方案
DOI：
10.1111/poms.13151
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发表时间：
2020-05
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Teo Chung-Piaw
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yang Ruina;Mai Yin-hua;Lee Chung-Yee;Teo Chung-Piaw
在一项关于销售人员激励设计的优雅研究中，Steenburgh和Ahearne（2012）认为，与公司中使用的传统方法相比，基于将员工分为落后者、核心员工和星星员工的多方面组合方法可以从销售人员中获得更好的结果。在本文中，我们构建了一个三件式的“线性-二次-线性”结构的激励合同组合，并研究了它们的激励效果。众所周知，这种合同可以提取100%的增量收益（即，当代理的性能水平是指数分布或均匀分布时，它的效果是最优的），但在性能水平是正态分布的更自然的情况下，它的效果仍然是未知的。我们发现，当努力的成本函数是二次的，绩效水平是正态分布时，建议的三件式合同可以捕获超过95.32%的增量收益，从最优激励合同获得固定工资合同。在这种情况下，更传统的三件式线性合约具有相应的82.64%的严格下限。有趣的是，这与两段线性合约的紧下限相同，因此当绩效水平遵循正态分布时，向合约中添加更多的线性片段无助于提高下限。这为Steenburgh和Ahearne（2012）倡导的投资组合方法的优越性提供了部分理论解释。
In an elegant study on salesforce incentive design, Steenburgh and Ahearne (2012) have argued that a multi‐faceted portfolio approach, based on the classification of workers into laggards, core, and star performers, can induce better result from the salesforce, compared to traditional approaches used in companies. In this paper, we construct a portfolio of incentive contracts with a three‐piece “linear–quadratic–linear” structure and study their incentive effects. It is well known that such contracts can extract 100% of the incremental benefits (i.e., optimal) when the performance levels of the agents are exponentially or uniformly distributed, but its effect is still unknown in the more natural case when performance levels are normally distributed. We show that the proposed three‐piece contract can capture more than 95.32% of the incremental benefits, obtained from the optimal incentive contract over fixed salary contract, when the cost functions of efforts are quadratic, and the performance levels are normally distributed. In this case, the more traditional three‐piece linear contract has a corresponding tight lower bound of 82.64%. Interestingly this is the same as the tight lower bound from a two‐piece linear contract, and thus adding more linear pieces to the contract does not help to improve the lower bound when the performance levels follow the normal distributions. This provides a partial theoretical explanation for the superiority of the portfolio approach advocated by Steenburgh and Ahearne (2012).
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影响因子：
3.8
作者：
R. Gibbons
通讯作者：
R. Gibbons
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
J. Laffont;J. Tirole
通讯作者：
J. Laffont;J. Tirole
DOI：
10.1257/aer.97.1.419
发表时间：
2007-02
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Leon Yang Chu;D. Sappington
通讯作者：
Leon Yang Chu;D. Sappington
DOI：
10.1257/000282803322157160
发表时间：
2003-05
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
W. Rogerson
通讯作者：
W. Rogerson
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2012-07
期刊：
ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Motivation & Incentives (Topic)
影响因子：
--
作者：
Thomas J. Steenburgh;M. Ahearne
通讯作者：
Thomas J. Steenburgh;M. Ahearne