Stability through control? The influence of coalition agreements on the stability of coalition cabinets
Stability through control? The influence of coalition agreements on the stability of coalition cabinets
复制标题
通过控制来稳定?
DOI:
10.1080/01402382.2018.1453596
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发表时间:
--
影响因子:
4.2
通讯作者:
Svenja
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Krauss;Svenja
Why do some coalition cabinets terminate early and others run until the end of the legislative term? This article analyses whether coalition agreements lower the risk of early government termination. The main argument is that coalition agreements can increase the stability of coalition cabinets as they lower the probability of intra-cabinet conflict. The theoretical expectations are empirically evaluated on the basis of a newly compiled comprehensive dataset on cabinet duration and control mechanisms in coalition governments. Drawing on event history analysis, the effect of coalition agreements on cabinet duration is tested for 420 coalition cabinets from 1945 until 2015 in 23 Western and Eastern European countries. The results show that the existence and duration of a coalition agreement lower the risk of early government termination. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the interaction between coalition governance and coalition termination.
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