Regulatory jurisdiction and policy coordination: A bi-level modeling approach for performance-based environmental policy

Regulatory jurisdiction and policy coordination: A bi-level modeling approach for performance-based environmental policy
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监管管辖权和政策协调:基于绩效的环境政策的双层建模方法

DOI:
10.1080/01605682.2020.1843980
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
3.6
通讯作者:
Siddiqui, Afzal S.
Siddiqui, Afzal S.
中科院分区:
管理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tanaka, Makoto;Chen, Yihsu;Siddiqui, Afzal S.

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这项研究讨论了基于政策制定者的领导者-追随者博弈的政策建模的重要方面。我们具体调查政策制定者之间的不合作以及通过双层规划监管的管辖范围。本文选择美国清洁能源计划下的绩效导向型环境政策作为分析对象。我们认为,政策制定者的合作是在增进福利。有些违反直觉的是,政策制定者之间的充分协调使得以绩效为基础的环境政策变得多余。我们还发现,不同的各州监管比更广泛的地区性监管产生更高的社会福利。这是因为,即使在各州的环境监管下,发电商也可以参与单一的电力市场,并通过调整各州的发电量来套利二氧化碳的价格差异。对一个程式化测试网络实施的数值例子说明了理论发现。
This study discusses important aspects of policy modeling based on a leader-follower game of policymakers. We specifically investigate non-cooperation between policymakers and the jurisdictional scope of regulation via bi-level programming. Performance-based environmental policy under the Clean Power Plan in the United States is chosen for our analysis. We argue that the cooperation of policymakers is welfare enhancing. Somewhat counterintuitively, full coordination among policymakers renders performance-based environmental policy redundant. We also find that distinct state-by-state regulation yields higher social welfare than broader regional regulation. This is because power producers can participate in a single power market even under state-by-state environmental regulation and arbitrage away the CO2price differences by adjusting their generation across states. Numerical examples implemented for a stylized test network illustrate the theoretical findings.
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