Leader-Based Collective Bargaining: Cooperation Mechanism and Incentive Analysis
Leader-Based Collective Bargaining: Cooperation Mechanism and Incentive Analysis
复制标题
基于领导者的集体谈判：合作机制与激励分析
DOI：
10.1287/msom.2016.0592
复制
发表时间：
2017-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Xiao Wenqiang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hsu Vernon Ning;Lai Guoming;Niu Baozhuang;Xiao Wenqiang
我们研究了基于领导者的集体谈判LCB，在这种情况下，一个领先的买方领导者和一个跟随的买方跟随者形成一个联盟，共同购买一个共同的组件从供应商。虽然领导者和追随者在购买组件方面进行合作，但他们在销售最终产品方面进行竞争。我们首先分析了最常见和最简单的LCB形式，等价LCB，在这种情况下，跟随者支付给领导者的批发价格与领导者通过与供应商谈判获得的批发价格相同。我们比较了每个买方的利润下，平均价格的LCB与基准，每个买方分别从供应商购买。我们发现，虽然联盟可能会获得一个较低的批发价格，虽然领导者总是更好的价格LCB下，跟随者可以更糟，如果领导者和跟随者的产品的竞争强度是在一个中间区域。我们确定了一个竞争的影响，导致平等的价格LCB，可以在竞争中处于不利地位的追随者。这一发现意味着，同等价格的LCB在实践中可能是不可持续的。鉴于这一局限性，我们研究了LCB的另一种形式，固定价格LCB，在这种情况下，追随者支付固定价格的领导者，而不管批发价格的领导者从供应商获得。我们发现，固定价格LCB不仅有利于领导者，而且追随者，与单独购买相比，这意味着固定价格LCB总是实现了双赢的结果，为买家。我们的分析进一步表明，即使是供应商也可能从这种形式的LCB中受益。
We study leader-based collective bargaining LCB, under which a leading buyer leader and a following buyer follower form an alliance to jointly purchase a common component from a supplier. Although the leader and the follower cooperate in their component purchase, they compete in selling their end products. We first analyze the most common and simple form of LCB, equal price LCB, under which the follower pays to the leader the same wholesale price that the leader obtains from his negotiation with the supplier. We compare each buyer's profit under the equal price LCB with the benchmark where each buyer purchases separately from the supplier. We find that although the alliance might obtain a lower wholesale price and although the leader is always better off under equal price LCB, the follower can be worse off if the competition intensity of the leader's and follower's products is within an intermediate region. We identify a competition effect resulting from equal price LCB that can place the follower at a disadvantage in the competition. This finding implies that the equal price LCB might not be sustainable in practice. In view of this limitation, we investigate an alternative form of LCB, fixed price LCB, under which the follower pays a fixed price to the leader regardless of the wholesale price the leader obtains from the supplier. We show that fixed price LCB benefits not only the leader but also the follower, compared with separate purchases, which implies that fixed price LCB always achieves a win-win outcome for the buyers. Our analysis further shows that even the supplier might benefit from this form of LCB.
登录
查看更多内容
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2007-09
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
F. Schotanus
通讯作者：
F. Schotanus
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
F. Schotanus;J. Telgen
通讯作者：
F. Schotanus;J. Telgen
影响因子：
3.8
作者：
C. Davidson
通讯作者：
C. Davidson
DOI：
10.1016/j.dss.2006.11.002
发表时间：
2007-03
期刊：
Decis. Support Syst.
影响因子：
--
作者：
Jing Chen;Xilong Chen;Xiping Song
通讯作者：
Jing Chen;Xilong Chen;Xiping Song
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2297155
发表时间：
2013-07
期刊：
CSR & Management Practice eJournal
影响因子：
--
作者：
Stephen P. King
通讯作者：
Stephen P. King