Propositional apriority and the nesting problem
Propositional apriority and the nesting problem
复制标题
命题优先性和嵌套问题
DOI:
10.1007/s11098-016-0728-x
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
Kipper
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Kipper
According to the modal account of propositional apriority, a proposition is a priori if it is possible to know it with a priori justification. Assuming that modal truths are necessarily true and that there are contingent a priori truths, this account has the undesirable consequence that a proposition can be a priori in a world in which it is false. Epistemic two-dimensionalism faces the same problem, since on its standard interpretation, it also entails that a priori propositions are necessarily a priori. In response to this problem, Chalmers and Rabern propose an alternative conception of propositional apriority as well as two-dimensional truth-conditions for apriority statements. Their proposal is also supposed to avoid another problem for the modal account, namely that it entails the existence of false instances of ‘φ iff actually φ’. I discuss Chalmers and Rabern’s account and point out a number of problems with it. I then develop my own account of propositional apriority that solves the problems in question, that can be accepted by friends and foes of two-dimensionalism alike, and that is also neutral with respect to the question of how one construes the objects of propositional apriority.
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DOI:
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发表时间:
2006
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
D. Chalmers
通讯作者:
D. Chalmers
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2015
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Daniel Nolan
通讯作者:
Daniel Nolan
影响因子:
1.8
作者:
D. Chalmers
通讯作者:
D. Chalmers
影响因子:
1.6
作者:
Hugh S. Chandler
通讯作者:
Hugh S. Chandler
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
D. Chalmers
通讯作者:
D. Chalmers