Performance Commitments of Controlling Shareholders and Earnings Management
Performance Commitments of Controlling Shareholders and Earnings Management
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控股股东业绩承诺及盈余管理情况
DOI：
10.1111/1911-3846.12111
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发表时间：
2015-09
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Guochang Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qinglu Jin;Rong Yang;Hongqi Yuan;Guochang Zhang
自2005年股权分置改革在中国生效以来，非流通股股东（控股股东）必须与流通股股东（少数股东）协商才能获得流动权。在达成的典型交易中，控股股东同意向小股东支付股份补偿，在许多情况下，还承诺实现特定的公司绩效目标（绩效承诺）。利用这一改革设置，我们考察了绩效承诺对盈余管理行为的影响，并发现了以下结果。首先，利润较低的公司有更大的动机做出业绩承诺，这有助于减少控股股东必须支付的股份补偿。其次，当实际业绩达不到预期目标时，企业会进行盈余管理以达到承诺的业绩目标，而面临更大违约成本的企业往往会更积极地管理盈余。第三，根据承诺合同中规定的绩效指标，企业采用不同的方法来管理盈余。我们还发现，依靠盈余管理来实现其绩效目标的公司在承诺后几年的表现不如不依赖盈余管理的公司。总体而言，我们的证据与公司控股股东和小股东之间的绩效承诺合同（包含代价高昂的违约）对盈余管理产生激励是一致的。
Since the Split Share Structure Reform took effect in China in 2005, holders of nontradable shares (controlling shareholders) have had to negotiate with holders of tradable shares (minority shareholders) to gain the liquidity right. In a typical deal reached, the controlling shareholder agrees to pay share compensation to minority shareholders and, in many cases, also pledges to meet a specific firm performance target (performance commitments). Using this reform setting, we examine the impact of performance commitments on earnings management behavior, and find the following results. First, less profitable firms have greater incentives to make performance commitments that help to reduce the share compensation that controlling shareholders have to pay. Second, firms entering into such commitments engage in earnings management to meet the promised performance target when actual performance falls short, and firms facing greater default costs tend to manage earnings more aggressively. Third, depending on the performance metric stipulated in the commitment contract, firms employ varying methods to manage earnings. We also find that firms that rely on earnings management to meet their performance targets display inferior performance in the postcommitment years relative to firms that do not. Overall, our evidence is consistent with performance commitment contracts (with costly defaults) between a firm's controlling and minority shareholders causing incentives for earnings management.
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影响因子：
3.6
作者：
I. Haw;D. Qi;Donghui Wu;Woody Wu
通讯作者：
I. Haw;D. Qi;Donghui Wu;Woody Wu
影响因子：
5.9
作者：
Larcker, David F.;Rusticus, Tjomme O.
通讯作者：
Rusticus, Tjomme O.
DOI：
10.1002/9781119204763.ch4
发表时间：
1994-02
期刊：
Accounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association
影响因子：
--
作者：
Patricia M. Dechow;Richard G. Sloan;A. P. Sweeney
通讯作者：
Patricia M. Dechow;Richard G. Sloan;A. P. Sweeney
影响因子：
3.9
作者：
M. Firth;Chen Lin;H. Zou
通讯作者：
M. Firth;Chen Lin;H. Zou
DOI：
10.2308/accr.2004.79.3.645
发表时间：
2004-01
期刊：
The Accounting Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Kevin C. W. Chen;Hongqi Yuan
通讯作者：
Kevin C. W. Chen;Hongqi Yuan