A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies

A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies
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考虑政府补贴的节能产品绿色供应链决策模型

DOI:
10.3390/su11082209
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发表时间:
2019-04
期刊:
影响因子:
3.9
通讯作者:
Yan Xu
Yan Xu
中科院分区:
环境科学与生态学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jian Xue;Ruifeng Gong;Laijun Zhao;Xiaoqing Ji;Yan Xu

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政府补贴是促进节能减排的常用政策。政府补贴下的节能产品绿色供应链决策是一个非常有学术意义的领域,博弈论正在成为这方面研究的一个流行工具。本文研究了绿色供应链的集中式和分散式决策模型以及基于博弈论的收益共享契约协调决策模型。我们研究了政府补贴对节能产品零售价格、节能水平、市场需求、供应链利润和社会福利的影响。然后,我们比较了三个模型的有效性,使用一个数值例子。我们的研究结果揭示了制造商和零售商的利润增加的合同参数的范围。研究结果表明,政府补贴能够显著提高社会福利,促进节能产品的改进。集中决策比分散决策产生更高的利润,政府补贴与节能水平,产品价格和市场需求呈正相关。收益共享契约协调决策可以协调供应链,达到与集中式决策相同的效果。
Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.
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