Conservation payments and perceptions of equity: Experimental evidence from Indonesia, Peru, and Tanzania
Conservation payments and perceptions of equity: Experimental evidence from Indonesia, Peru, and Tanzania
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保护费和公平观念：来自印度尼西亚、秘鲁和坦桑尼亚的实验证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.crsust.2023.100212
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
Andersson, Krister P.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cook, Nathan J.;Grillos, Tara;Andersson, Krister P.
虽然金钱奖励可能是鼓励保护热带森林以减少温室气体排放的一种有希望的工具，但这种奖励的公平影响正在引起仔细审查。此外，关于项目设计如何影响项目参与者对公平和公平的看法，我们所知甚少，而且，将支付分配的决策权下放给当地领导人是否有助于或损害当地对公平的看法，我们仍不清楚。我们在印度尼西亚、秘鲁和坦桑尼亚的农村对448名参与者进行了“实地实验室”实验，围绕生态系统服务集体支付（PES）计划的两个版本进行了框架。参与者认为，当集体报酬根据当地选出的领导人的自由裁量权进行分配时，与设计的完全平等的报酬分配相比，该计划不太公平。这种负面影响只出现在那些获得低份额报酬的参与者身上，这表明并不是领导者本身的参与导致了对公平的看法降低，而是当领导者有自由裁量权选择如何分配报酬时，有时会出现报酬分配的不平等。研究结果强调了设计保护激励计划的重要性，该计划在鼓励公平的地方决策的同时，为地方参与提供了机会。
While monetary incentives may be a promising tool for encouraging tropical forest conservation in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the equity implications of such incentives are drawing scrutiny. Furthermore, little is known about how program design shapes perceptions of fairness and equity among program participants, and it remains unclear whether devolving the decision power over the distribution of payments to local leaders helps or harms local perceptions of equity. We implemented a ‘lab-in-the-field’ experiment with 448 participants in rural villages in Indonesia, Peru, and Tanzania, framed around two versions of a collective payments for ecosystem services (PES) program. Participants perceived the program as less equitable when the collective payment was distributed according to the discretion of a locally chosen leader, compared to when the payment was distributed perfectly equally by design. The negative effect is only seen among participants who were given a low share of the payment, which suggests that it is not the involvement of a leader per se that leads to lower perceptions of equity, but the inegalitarian distribution of the payment that sometimes occurs when a leader has the discretion to choose how the payment is distributed. The results highlight the importance of designing conservation incentive programs that give opportunities for local involvement while still encouraging equitable local decisions.
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