The adverse selection effect of corporate cash reserve: Evidence from acquisitions solely financed by stock
The adverse selection effect of corporate cash reserve: Evidence from acquisitions solely financed by stock
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企业现金储备的逆向选择效应：来自纯股票融资收购的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.03.002
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Gao N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gao N
企业现金储备具有逆向选择效应。具体地说，如果投资者知道一家公司不必发行债券就可以投资，那么试图发行债券就会发出估值过高的强烈信号。这一概念尽管具有直观性，但在现有的经验文献中还没有得到明确的研究。使用完全通过股票融资的收购样本来排除自由现金流的潜在复杂性，我发现，对于拥有较高超额现金储备的竞购者来说，公告回报较低。在股票市场火热的年份，或者当竞购者的独立价值更难评估时，这种影响会更强烈。我还发现了支持这样一种观点的证据：在正常(股市不火爆)的年份，塔吉特要求现金支付以剔除“柠檬”竞购者，但在股市火爆的年份却接受过多的股票报价。收购完成后，高超额现金储备竞购者在运营上的表现要好于低超额现金储备竞购者。此外，与超额现金储备较低的竞标者相比，他们将更多的资金用于减少债务，而不是更多地用于投资。综合这些结果可以看出，现金储备存在信息成本。此外，他们强调了Rhodes-Kropf和Viswanathan(2004)的双边信息不对称框架在描述合并结果而不求助于行为或机构解释方面的重要性。
Corporate cash reserve has an adverse selection effect. Specifically, if investors know a company does not have to issue to invest, an attempt to do so sends a strong signal of overvaluation. This notion has not been explicitly studied in the extant empirical literature, despite its intuitiveness. Using a sample of acquisitions solely financed by stock to exclude the potential complications of free cash flow, I find that announcement returns are lower for a bidder with a higher excess cash reserve. This effect is stronger in hot equity market years or when a bidder's standalone value is more difficult to evaluate. I also find evidence supporting the idea that targets request cash payment to remove “lemon” bidders in normal (non-hot equity market) years, but accept too many stock offers in hot equity market years. After acquisitions, high-excess-cash-reserve bidders operationally outperform low-excess-cash-reserve bidders. Further, they spend more funds on reducing debt but not more on investments, compared with low-excess-cash-reserve bidders. Combined, these results show that cash reserve has information costs. Further, they highlight the importance of the two-sided information asymmetry framework of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) in describing merger outcomes without resorting to behavioral or agency explanations.
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6288.1987.tb01263.x
发表时间：
1987
期刊：
The Financial Review
影响因子：
--
作者：
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.99580
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1999-03
期刊：
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影响因子：
--
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影响因子：
8.2
作者：
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通讯作者：
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影响因子：
8.9
作者：
Opler, T;Pinkowitz, L;Williamson, R
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影响因子：
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