Profits from Peace: the Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption
Profits from Peace: the Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption
复制标题
和平的利润：权力分享与腐败的政治经济学
DOI：
10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.07.006
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Martin Ottmann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Martin Ottmann
权力分享会导致冲突后国家的腐败吗？我们将任何冲突后局势中的政府精英视为寻租代理人，他们需要确保其主要选民的支持以继续掌权。权力分享制度特别是内阁级别的行政权力分享制度系统地塑造了这些寻租动机。权力分享内阁建立了由政府和反叛精英小圈子主导的政治联盟，这些精英可以直接获得国家资源，对政府领导人的忠诚度很低。此外，许多权力分享机构的临时性质增加了寻租动机：权力分享联盟中的寻租精英在任期有限的情况下，可能会在离任前获取尽可能多的租金。因此，具有权力分享机构的冲突后国家，如果以一国的腐败程度来衡量，其寻租行为的总体水平应该更高。在对1996 - 2010年所有冲突后局势的统计分析中，我们发现，权力分享内阁大大增加了冲突后国家的腐败，这种影响在自然资源租金存在的情况下更为强烈。这些调查结果为关于冲突后腐败驱动因素的辩论提供了量化证据。此外，它们突出表明，短期稳定与腐败对冲突后政治和经济发展的长期负面影响之间存在着一种权衡。
Does power-sharing drive corruption in post-conflict countries? We conceptualize government elites in any post-conflict situation as rent-seeking agents who need to ensure the support of their key constituencies to remain in power. Power-sharing institutions—especially cabinet-level, executive power-sharing institutions—systematically shape these rent-seeking motives. Power-sharing cabinets create political coalitions dominated by small circles of government and rebel elites with direct access to state resources and low levels of loyalty toward the government leader. Also, the provisional nature of many power-sharing institutions increases rent-seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in office, rent-seeking elites within the power-sharing coalition are likely to capture as many rents as possible before they have to leave office. Thus, post-conflict countries with power-sharing institutions should exhibit higher aggregated levels of rent-seeking measured as the level of corruption in a country. In a statistical analysis of all post-conflict situations during 1996–2010, we find that power-sharing cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries and that this effect is stronger in the presence of natural resource rents. These findings add quantitative evidence to the debate about drivers of post-conflict corruption. Moreover, they highlight a trade-off between short-term stability and long-term negative effects of corruption for post-conflict political and economic development.
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影响因子：
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作者：
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影响因子：
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作者：
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影响因子：
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作者：
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影响因子：
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作者：
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影响因子：
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