A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pone.0072427
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Capraro V
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Capraro V
社会困境是指集体利益与个人利益不一致的情况：污染、自然资源枯竭和群体间冲突是它们的核心社会困境。由于社会困境的多学科性和重要性，经济学家、生物学家、心理学家、社会学家和政治学家都对其进行了研究。这些研究通常通过将人们分为亲社会型和亲社会型来解释合作倾向，或者诉诸外部控制的形式，或者在反复出现的社会困境中诉诸长期战略。但最近的实验表明，即使在没有外部控制的一次性社会困境中，合作也是可能的，合作的速度通常取决于回报。这使得亲社会者和亲社会者之间不可能有预测性的区分，证明了人对合作的态度是天生的。这篇文章的关键创新实际上是假设人类天生对合作有态度，因此他们不会像标准经济模型所假设的那样，作为单一行动者先验地行动，而是预测如果他们形成联盟，社会困境将如何演变，然后他们根据最乐观的预测行事。将这一想法形式化，我们提出了第一个人类合作的预测模型，该模型能够组织标准模型无法解释的许多不同的实验结果。我们还表明，该模型对一次性社会困境中的群体平均行为做出了令人满意的准确定量预测。
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.
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