Quality contracts with the supplier's private product manufacturability information
Quality contracts with the supplier's private product manufacturability information
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质量合同与供应商的私有产品可制造性信息
DOI：
10.1016/j.cie.2018.08.033
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发表时间：
2018-11
影响因子：
7.9
通讯作者：
Jie Gao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bin Cao;Jie Gao
在生产外包环境下，制造商也可能将产品设计外包给供应商。在这种情况下，供应商不仅决定了制造过程中的质量努力，而且还决定了生产的容易程度，这在产品设计过程中形成，并被称为产品可制造性。制造工作量和产品可制造性（低型或高型）都可能是供应商的私人信息。本文研究了在产品可制造性信息不对称的条件下，制造商的分离均衡计件工资质量契约（质量惩罚基于供应商的绝对质量绩效）和锦标赛质量契约（质量惩罚基于供应商的相对绩效）。在计件质量契约下，低类型产品可制造性的供应商付出的努力低于第一最佳水平，获得保留收益，而高类型产品可制造性的供应商付出的努力高于第一最佳水平，获得正的信息租金。相比之下，在锦标赛质量契约下，低类型的供应商获得了信息租金，而高类型的供应商只获得了保留收益。最后，我们通过一个数值例子发现，当制造商认为供应商是高类型的低（高）概率时，制造商更喜欢计件（锦标赛）质量合同。
In the production outsourcing environment, the manufacturer may also outsource the product design to the supplier. In this case, the supplier determines not only the quality effort during the manufacturing process but also the ease degree of production, which comes into being during the product design process and is referred to as product manufacturability. Both the manufacturing effort and the product manufacturability (either low- or high-type) may be the supplier’s private information. In this paper, we examine the manufacturer’s separating equilibrium piece rate quality contract (the quality penalty is based on the supplier’s absolute quality performance) and tournament quality contract (the quality penalty is based on relative performance) under asymmetric product manufacturability information. With the piece rate quality contract, the supplier with low-type product manufacturability exerts a lower manufacturing effort than the first-best level and obtains the reservation payoff, while the high-type supplier spends the first-best effort and earns a positive information rent. By contrast, with the tournament quality contract, the low-type supplier obtains an information rent, while the high-type supplier only gets the reservation payoff. Finally, we find that the manufacturer prefers the piece rate (tournament) quality contract when the manufacturer believes the supplier is high-type with a low (high) probability by a numerical example.
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1060.0557
发表时间：
2006-10
期刊：
Manag. Sci.
影响因子：
--
作者：
Iny Hwang;S. Radhakrishnan;L. Su
通讯作者：
Iny Hwang;S. Radhakrishnan;L. Su
DOI：
10.1002/nav.21527
发表时间：
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期刊：
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影响因子：
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2341925
发表时间：
2013-10
期刊：
Employee Social Responsibility & HR Practices eJournal
影响因子：
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作者：
Theofanis Tsoulouhas
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Theofanis Tsoulouhas
DOI：
10.1108/mrjiam-03-2015-0580
发表时间：
2015-08
期刊：
Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
影响因子：
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作者：
A. B. Pintado;R. Kaufmann;Javier Merino Diaz-de-Cerio
通讯作者：
A. B. Pintado;R. Kaufmann;Javier Merino Diaz-de-Cerio
影响因子：
3.6
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通讯作者：
Bin Shen;Qingying Li;C. Dong;Vincent Quan