Optimal pricing contracts and level of information asymmetry in a supply chain
Optimal pricing contracts and level of information asymmetry in a supply chain
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最优定价合同和供应链中的信息不对称程度
DOI：
10.1111/itor.12237
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发表时间：
2018-09
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Zhaohua Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jian-cai Wang;Liu Yang;Yao-yu Wang;Zhaohua Wang
本文研究了一个由一个主导供应商和一个买方组成的典型化供应链模型，其中买方对自己的私有成本信息具有上级知识。供应商对购买者成本的不完全了解由主观分布表示。通过假设分布是均匀的，我们首先推导出供应商提供的两种合同格式的最优均衡结果的显式表达式，分别是简单的价格合同和复杂的合同菜单。基于最优结果，我们继续研究供应商的期望利润如何随着信息不对称水平的变化，这是衡量供应商的主观分布的方差。我们的研究结果表明，供应商的预期利润最初减少，然后增加供应商的知识买方的成本变得越来越不确定。也就是说，如果供应商可以选择信息不对称的水平，她会更喜欢对称的情况（方差为零）或完全不对称的情况（方差尽可能高）。数值实验表明，我们的结果仍然成立时，我们考虑到这样的分布，截断伽玛和正常的，和一个固定的支持，而不是移动的支持的分布函数。
This study considers a stylized supply chain model consisting of a dominant supplier and a buyer, in which the latter possesses superior knowledge of his private cost information. The supplier's imperfect knowledge about the buyer's cost is denoted by a subjective distribution. By assuming that the distribution is uniform, we first derive the explicit expressions of the optimal equilibrium outcomes of two contract formats offered by the supplier, the simple price‐only contract and sophisticated menu of contracts, respectively. Based on the optimal results, we continue to investigate how the supplier's expected profit varies with the level of information asymmetry, which is measured by the variance of the supplier's subjective distribution. Our findings indicate that the supplier's expected profits initially decrease and then increase as the supplier's knowledge of the buyer's cost becomes increasingly uncertain. That is, if the supplier could choose the level of information asymmetry, she would prefer a symmetric case (with the variance being zero) or a totally asymmetric case (with the variance being as high as possible). Numerical experiments demonstrate that our result still holds when we take into account such distributions as a truncated gamma and normal, and a fixed support of the distribution function instead of a moving support.
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