Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition
Endogenous leadership and sustainability of enhanced cooperation in a repeated interactions model of tax competition: Endogenous leadership in tax competition
复制标题
税收竞争重复互动模型中的内生领导力与加强合作的可持续性:税收竞争中的内生领导力
DOI:
10.1111/jpet.12624
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发表时间:
2023
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Jun-ichi Itaya and Chikara Yamaguchi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xinxin Ma;Takashi Oshio;Jun-ichi Itaya and Chikara Yamaguchi
In this study, the endogenous timing of moves is analyzed in an infinitely repeated game setting of capital tax competition between a subgroup (a tax union) of countries agreeing on partial tax harmonization and outside countries. It is shown that in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated tax competition game, theysimultaneouslyset capital taxes in every stage gamewhen a tax union comprises similar countries with respect to productivity, whereas they may set capital taxessequentiallyin every stage gamewhen a tax union comprises dissimilar countries. This finding is significantly different from Ogawa (2013), although we also assume thatcapital is owned by the country's residents, as in Ogawa's model. This is because a disadvantaged member country of the tax union would suffer from larger losseswhen a tax union comprising dissimilar countries, and thus the tax union will choose the strategy of movingLatefor the sake of sustaining tax harmonization to avoid such losses.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2010
期刊:
Social Science Research Network
影响因子:
--
作者:
H. Vrijburg;Ruud A. De Mooij
通讯作者:
Ruud A. De Mooij
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1999
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Kai A. Konrad;Guttorm Schjelderup
通讯作者:
Guttorm Schjelderup
影响因子:
0.7
作者:
Rosanne Altshuler;Timothy J. Goodspeed
通讯作者:
Timothy J. Goodspeed
影响因子:
3.1
作者:
T. Eichner
通讯作者:
T. Eichner
影响因子:
1
作者:
S. Bucovetsky
通讯作者:
S. Bucovetsky