Effects of differential risk attitudes in collaborative systems design

Effects of differential risk attitudes in collaborative systems design
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协作系统设计中不同风险态度的影响

DOI:
10.1002/sys.21687
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发表时间:
2023
影响因子:
2
通讯作者:
Grogan, Paul T.
Grogan, Paul T.
中科院分区:
工程技术3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Avşar, Alkım Z.;Grogan, Paul T.

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协作使具有不同目标的多个参与者能够共同努力,实现超越个人能力的目标。然而,与追求一个独立的系统相比,合作伙伴的行动带来的战略不确定性带来了在失败的合作下可能出现的损失。合作系统的高价值但不确定的结果与独立系统的低价值但更确定的结果之间的根本权衡导致了一种双稳态战略动态。行为者表现出不同的风险态度,在不确定的情况下影响决策,这使得对合作动态的共同理解复杂化。本文通过博弈论的视角研究了风险态度如何影响协同系统中的设计和战略决策。首先,一个分析模型研究了两个参与者问题中不同风险态度的影响,其中猎鹿战略动态被描述为单水平博弈和双层博弈。接下来,一个模拟模型根据之前的行为实验,在29场比赛中将不同风险态度的参与者配对。结果表明,合作设计问题的结果会随着双方风险态度的不同而变化。结果还强调,考虑保守的较低级别的设计选项通过为厌恶风险的参与者提供更安全的解决方案来促进协作。通过接受决策行为者并不都是风险中立的这一事实,未来的工作寻求开发新的设计方法,以加强对高效协作解决方案的采用。
Collaboration enables multiple actors with different objectives to work together and achieve a goal beyond individual capabilities. However, strategic uncertainty from partners' actions introduces a potential for losses under failed collaboration relative to pursuing an independent system. The fundamental tradeoff between high‐value but uncertain outcomes from collaborative systems and lower‐value but more certain outcomes for independent systems induces a bistability strategic dynamic. Actors exhibit different risk attitudes that impact decisions under uncertainty which complicate shared understanding of collaborative dynamics. This paper investigates how risk attitudes affect design and strategy decisions in collaborative systems through the lens of game theory. First, an analytical model studies the effect of differential risk attitudes in a two‐actor problem with stag‐hunting strategic dynamics formulated as single‐ and bi‐level games. Next, a simulation model pairs actors with different risk attitudes in a 29‐game tournament based on a prior behavioral experiment. Results show that outcomes collaborative design problems change based on the risk attitudes of both actors. Results also emphasize that considering conservative lower‐level design options facilitates collaboration by providing risk‐averse actors with a safer solution. By accepting that decision‐making actors are not all risk‐neutral, future work seeks to develop new design methods to strengthen the adoption of efficient collaborative solutions.
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DOI: --
发表时间: 2016
影响因子: 4.1
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