Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments

Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments
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DOI:
10.1007/s10101-023-00293-6
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发表时间:
2023-03-27
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
--
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
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这项研究考察了国家或国家之间对有组织犯罪的战略打击政策。特别是,我们考虑了不同区域的有组织犯罪如何影响对面临协调失败问题的地方政府的最佳制裁。我们展示了有组织犯罪集团之间的战略关系(即互补或替代)如何影响地方政府之间在打击有组织犯罪方面的战略关系。我们还证明了,如果有组织犯罪集团的活动是互补的,则未协调的均衡制裁水平低于有协调的第一最优制裁水平;如果有组织犯罪集团的活动相互替代,则未协调的均衡制裁水平高于有协调的第一最佳制裁水平。网上版载有补充材料,可在10.1007/s10101-023-00293-6查阅。
This study examines strategic crackdown policies on organized crime between states or nations. In particular, we consider how organized crimes in different regions can affect optimal sanctions for local governments, which face the problem of coordination failure. We demonstrate how the strategic relation between organized crime groups (i.e., complementarity or substitution) affects the strategic relationship between local governments with respect to crackdowns on organized crime. We also demonstrate that if organized crime groups’ activities complement each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is lower than the first-best sanction level with coordination and that if organized crime groups’ activities substitute each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is higher than the first-best sanction level with coordination. The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10101-023-00293-6.
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