Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments
Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments
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DOI:
10.1007/s10101-023-00293-6
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发表时间:
2023-03-27
影响因子:
0.9
通讯作者:
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
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This study examines strategic crackdown policies on organized crime between states or nations. In particular, we consider how organized crimes in different regions can affect optimal sanctions for local governments, which face the problem of coordination failure. We demonstrate how the strategic relation between organized crime groups (i.e., complementarity or substitution) affects the strategic relationship between local governments with respect to crackdowns on organized crime. We also demonstrate that if organized crime groups’ activities complement each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is lower than the first-best sanction level with coordination and that if organized crime groups’ activities substitute each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is higher than the first-best sanction level with coordination. The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10101-023-00293-6.
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影响因子:
1
作者:
Friehe, Tim;Miceli, Thomas J.
通讯作者:
Miceli, Thomas J.
DOI:
10.2307/136273
发表时间:
1997-11-01
影响因子:
1.6
作者:
Marceau, N
通讯作者:
Marceau, N
影响因子:
8.2
作者:
BECKER, GS
通讯作者:
BECKER, GS
影响因子:
10.7
作者:
Dell, Melissa
通讯作者:
Dell, Melissa
影响因子:
2
作者:
Chiu, S;Mansley, EC;Morgan, J
通讯作者:
Morgan, J