Lack of cross-scale linkages reduces robustness of community-based fisheries management.
Lack of cross-scale linkages reduces robustness of community-based fisheries management.
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pone.0006253
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发表时间：
2009-07-16
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Basurto X
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cudney-Bueno R;Basurto X
全世界都提倡以社区为基础的管理和建立海洋保护区，以此作为克服渔业过度开发的手段。然而，研究人员和管理人员对这些措施的有效性存在分歧。“公地悲剧”模式往往被接受为一种普遍范式，它假定除非由国家管理或私有化，否则由于个人的自身利益与整个群体的目标之间的冲突，公地资源不可避免地会被过度开发。在这种模式下，不可能出现和维持有效的社区努力，包括建立海洋保护区等合作性风险决定。在本文中，我们质疑这些假设，并表明公地困境的结果可以是复杂的和规模依赖的。我们研究了在墨西哥加州湾建立、监测和执行海洋保护区网络的社区管理工作的演变和有效性。我们的研究结果建立在社会和生态研究之前（1997-2001年），期间（2002年）和之后（2003-2004年）的海洋保护区，其中包括参与观察超过100捕鱼旅行和会议，访谈，以及渔业依赖和独立的监测。我们发现，当地制定和执行的采伐规则导致资源丰度迅速增加。尽管如此，有关这一增长的消息在区域范围内迅速传播，导致外来者的偷猎行为，并对渔业资源和当地制定的规则遵守情况产生了迅速的连锁反应。我们表明，合作管理的共同池渔业，其中海洋保护区形成的系统的核心组成部分，可以出现，迅速发展，并在当地规模的有效，即使在最近组织的渔业。利益有关者参与监测，对系统的反应迅速作出反馈，可在加强合作方面发挥关键作用。然而，如果没有与更高级别的治理建立跨规模联系，当地渔业资源的增加可能会吸引外来者，如果不加以限制，他们将过度捕捞，威胁到地方治理。渔民和渔业社区需要奖励措施来维持其管理努力。通过正式的跨规模治理认可和支持来奖励当地有效管理，可以产生这些激励措施。
Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these measures. The “tragedy of the commons” model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish, monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological research before (1997–2001), during (2002) and after (2003–2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included participant observation in >100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance. Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge, evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support can generate these incentives.
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影响因子：
2.5
作者：
Basurto, X
通讯作者：
Basurto, X
影响因子：
3.5
作者：
Lejano, Raul P.;Ingram, Helen
通讯作者：
Ingram, Helen
影响因子：
56.9
作者：
Roberts, CM;Bohnsack, JA;Goodridge, R
通讯作者：
Goodridge, R
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0403239101
发表时间：
2004-06-29
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Balmford, A;Gravestock, P;Roberts, CM
通讯作者：
Roberts, CM
影响因子：
4.6
作者：
Cudney-Bueno, R.;Bourillon, L.;Shaw, W. W.
通讯作者：
Shaw, W. W.