Theoretical Analysis of Economic Rationality

经济理性的理论分析

• 批准号: 8707492
• 负责人: Robert Frank
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Cornell University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-08-01 至 1990-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8707492&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Theoretical; Analysis; Economic; Rationality

This interesting project examines the basic behavioral foundations of economic analysis. The fundamental concept underpinning economic theory regarding the purchase of consumer goods and services, participation in the labor market, and the establishment of contracts between people or institutions is the maximization of utility. That is to say, people make choices which they perceive will bring them the most satisfaction, and in doing so they forgo other choices. This seeming truism is both self-evident and profound at the same time. The approach has provided insights into many important questions. For instance, faced with a given wage rate, how much will people work? What fraction of their incomes will they save? What effect will a tax on gasoline have on the purchase of automobiles or on the number of miles driven. Clearly these are important questions to policy makers, producers, consumers, and other economic agents. The approach of utility maximization is, however, sometimes not readily applicable to observed human behavior. Many times people continue in behavior which to an observer appears irrational. Economists and psychologists who study such behavior often explain it as the result of human beings' inability to process effectively the ocean of information available to them. Thus they implicitly derive rules of thumb, or other shortcuts which allow for reasonably rapid decision making, but might not result in the choice which truly gives the most satisfaction over the long run. Economic agents enter into long term contracts with each other, even though in the short term each agent might be able to do better by acting independently. That is to say, each party to a contract might have the incentive to cheat, particularly if the cheating cannot be detected. This very innovative project explores the incentives to cheat on contracts, the types of information conveyed by individuals entering into contracts, and mechanisms which might diminish the incentive to cheat. Professor Frank uses a game theoretic framework to analyze the so- called prisoner's dilemma in a variety of interesting settings. In this manner he gains a great deal of insight into the information processing mechanisms of human behavior, and ultimately into the ability of economic agents to act in a rational manner.

这个有趣的项目考察了经济分析的基本行为基础。关于购买消费品和服务、参与劳动力市场以及建立人与人或机构之间的契约，支撑经济理论的基本概念是效用最大化。也就是说，人们做出他们认为会给他们带来最大满足感的选择，这样他们就放弃了其他选择。这似乎是不言自明的真理，同时也是深刻的。这种方法为许多重要问题提供了见解。例如，面对给定的工资率，人们会工作多少？他们会把收入的多少存起来？汽油税对购买汽车或行驶里程有什么影响？显然，这些问题对政策制定者、生产者、消费者和其他经济主体都很重要。然而，效用最大化的方法有时并不容易适用于观察到的人类行为。很多时候，人们的行为在旁观者看来是非理性的。研究这种行为的经济学家和心理学家经常将其解释为人类无法有效处理海量信息的结果。因此，他们隐含地推导出经验法则，或其他允许合理快速决策的捷径，但从长远来看，可能不会产生真正让人最满意的选择。经济主体彼此签订长期合同，即使在短期内，每个主体独立行动可能会做得更好。也就是说，合约的每一方都可能有欺骗的动机，尤其是在欺骗无法被发现的情况下。这个非常创新的项目探讨了在合同中欺骗的动机，签订合同的个人所传达的信息类型，以及可能减少欺骗动机的机制。弗兰克教授运用博弈论的框架，在各种有趣的情境下分析了所谓的囚徒困境。通过这种方式，他深入了解了人类行为的信息处理机制，并最终深入了解了经济主体以理性方式行事的能力。