RUI: Explaining Group Behavior

RUI：解释群体行为

• 批准号: 8719765
• 负责人: Paul Weirich
• 金额: $ 0.9万
• 依托单位: California State Polytechnic University-Pomona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-06-01 至 1989-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8719765&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: RUI; Explaining; Group; Behavior

Dr. Weirich is refining a common method of explaining group behavior that appeals to the course of action that a group would agree upon if conditions were ideal for reaching an agreement. In particular, he is specifying the course of action that a group would agree upon in ideal conditions. Dr. Weirich's approach, in contrast to other game theorists looking at this question, is what he calls weighted utilitarianism which uses more properties of a group than standard proposals use to determine the action that the group would agree upon in ideal conditions. Specifically, it uses interpersonal utilities and power structures. It is like utilitarianism except that it weighs utilities according to the social power of individuals before adding utilities. Dr. Weirich's earlier formulations of weighted utilitarianism imposed a restriction to bargaining problems in which there are no incentives for the formation of factions or coalitions that would splinter the group of bargainers. He has now removed this restriction. For this purpose, he has introduced a new conception of a stable agreement. According to it, being a stable agreement is similar to being an agreement that is in what others have called the bargaining set. He incorporates some refinements that come out of the recent literature on decision stability. In accomplishing this work, this project puts one of the most fruitful methods of explaining group behavior on a sound foundation.

魏里奇博士正在改进一种解释群体行为的通用方法，该方法呼吁在条件理想的情况下达成协议时群体会同意的行动方案。 特别是，他指定了一个团体在理想条件下会商定的行动方针。 与其他研究这个问题的博弈论学家相比，魏里奇博士的方法被他称为加权功利主义，它使用比标准提案更多的群体属性来确定群体在理想条件下会同意的行动。 具体来说，它使用人际效用和权力结构。 它类似于功利主义，只不过它在增加效用之前根据个人的社会权力来权衡效用。 魏里奇博士早期对加权功利主义的阐述对讨价还价问题施加了限制，在这些问题中，没有动机形成会分裂讨价还价者群体的派系或联盟。 现在他已经取消了这一限制。 为此，他引入了稳定协议的新概念。 根据它，稳定的协议类似于其他人所说的讨价还价集中的协议。 他结合了最近关于决策稳定性的文献中的一些改进。 在完成这项工作的过程中，该项目为解释群体行为最有效的方法之一奠定了坚实的基础。