RUI: Explaining Group Behavior

韦里奇博士正在完善一种解释群体行为的通用方法，这种方法适用于一个群体在条件适合达成协议的情况下会同意的行动方针。特别是，他具体说明了一个小组在理想条件下会达成一致的行动方针。与关注这个问题的其他博弈论者不同，韦里奇博士的方法是他所说的加权功利主义，它使用了更多的群体属性，而不是标准的提议，以确定该群体在理想条件下会同意的行动。具体地说，它使用人际公用事业和权力结构。它类似于功利主义，只是在增加公用事业之前，它根据个人的社会权力对公用事业进行权衡。韦里奇博士早期提出的加权功利主义对讨价还价问题施加了限制，在这些问题中，没有任何诱因会导致派系或联盟的形成，从而分裂谈判者群体。他现在已经取消了这一限制。为此，他提出了稳定协议的新概念。根据它的说法，一份稳定的协议类似于一份其他人所说的讨价还价的协议。他结合了最近关于决策稳定性的文献中的一些精炼。通过完成这项工作，这个项目将解释群体行为的最有成效的方法之一建立在坚实的基础上。

Dr. Weirich is refining a common method of explaining group behavior that appeals to the course of action that a group would agree upon if conditions were ideal for reaching an agreement. In particular, he is specifying the course of action that a group would agree upon in ideal conditions. Dr. Weirich's approach, in contrast to other game theorists looking at this question, is what he calls weighted utilitarianism which uses more properties of a group than standard proposals use to determine the action that the group would agree upon in ideal conditions. Specifically, it uses interpersonal utilities and power structures. It is like utilitarianism except that it weighs utilities according to the social power of individuals before adding utilities. Dr. Weirich's earlier formulations of weighted utilitarianism imposed a restriction to bargaining problems in which there are no incentives for the formation of factions or coalitions that would splinter the group of bargainers. He has now removed this restriction. For this purpose, he has introduced a new conception of a stable agreement. According to it, being a stable agreement is similar to being an agreement that is in what others have called the bargaining set. He incorporates some refinements that come out of the recent literature on decision stability. In accomplishing this work, this project puts one of the most fruitful methods of explaining group behavior on a sound foundation.