Dispute Initiation and Escalation in International Politics

国际政治争端的引发和升级

• 批准号: 8810836
• 负责人: Bruce Russett
• 金额: $ 8.29万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-07-01 至 1990-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8810836&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dispute; Initiation; Escalation; International; Politics

This research focuses on a topic of central importance in the field of international relations: the initiation and escalation of international conflicts. The research assesses how domestic economic and political conditions, as well as international political and military ones, influence the decisions of policy makers to threaten and use military force. Two phases in the process of escalation of force are analyzed: 1) the initial decision whether to confront an adversary directly and threaten him with force, and 2) after such a challenge, the decision whether to escalate the conflict and engage in sustained and large-scale use of military force. A theoretical model is developed for both phases and tested by means of statistical analysis 1) on a sample of 13 enduring international rivalries in which threats to use force were plausible, or did in fact occur, and 2) on the total set of 90 cases of international deterrence crises between 1870 and 1985. A subset of cases, comprising some well-explained by the statistical analysis and some poorly explained, are examined in depth to assess the adequacy and limits of the statistical analysis. This research should help answer several kinds of questions important to the social-scientific understanding of international relations such as: are the influences on decisions to initiate a conflict or crisis also central to explaining decisions to escalate international crises, or are the causes significantly different; how important are domestic economic and political conditions in explaining international conflict behavior. Is a more aggressive and conflictual foreign policy often a response to internal problems and weaknesses; what is the relative importance of defensive vs. opportunistic and expansionary incentives in decisions to threaten and/or resort to the use of military force; how important is a reputation for firmness or conciliation in a previous crisis to the success of deterrence in a new crisis. The research promises to significantly enhance our understanding of these topics.

这项研究集中在国际关系领域中的一个核心问题：国际冲突的发起和升级。这项研究评估了国内经济和政治状况以及国际政治和军事状况如何影响政策制定者威胁和使用军事力量的决定。分析了武力升级过程中的两个阶段：1)最初决定是否直接对抗对手并以武力威胁他；2)在这种挑战之后，决定是否升级冲突并持续大规模使用武力。建立了这两个阶段的理论模型，并通过统计分析进行了检验：1)对13个可能或确实存在使用武力威胁的持久国际竞争的样本进行了检验；2)对1870年至1985年期间发生的90起国际威慑危机进行了检验。深入研究了一些案例，包括一些统计分析解释得很好的案例和一些解释不充分的案例，以评估统计分析的充分性和局限性。这项研究应该有助于回答对国际关系的社会科学理解很重要的几类问题，例如：对发起冲突或危机的决定的影响是否也是解释国际危机升级的决定的核心，或者原因有显著不同；国内经济和政治条件在解释国际冲突行为方面有多重要。更具侵略性和冲突性的外交政策通常是对内部问题和弱点的回应；在作出使用武力威胁和(或)诉诸武力的决定时，防御性与机会主义和扩张性激励的相对重要性是什么；在以前的危机中坚定或和解的声誉对在新的危机中威慑的成功有多重要。这项研究有望显著提高我们对这些话题的理解。