Information Processing in Interactive Organizations

交互式组织中的信息处理

• 批准号: 8813371
• 负责人: James Jordan
• 金额: $ 10.93万
• 依托单位: University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-08-15 至 1991-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8813371&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Information; Processing; Interactive; Organizations

Most economic theories specify equilibrium relationships among economic variables, and, at least implicitly, the equilibrium information flows among economic decision-makers. However, the adjustment process which moves the system to an equilibrium position is usually not specified. This research proposes a method for analyzing a general class of such adjustment processes. The principal goal of this analysis is to determine the minimal communication and coordination among economic decision-makers needed to achieve equilibrium. This can be compared with the information flow generated by the economic institutions under study. If the latter is less than the former, equilibrium cannot generally be achieved, and the equilibrium relationships cannot reliably approximate actual economic behavior. This information analysis is proposed as a new source of discipline in the evaluation of economic models. When the convergence to equilibrium requires information which cannot easily be communicated in an ongoing fashion, two directions of research are suggested. First, the additional information might be inferred from the historical behavior of observable variables, and this information might then be used in the design of the adjustment process. Second, the equilibrium concept might be changed to embody more modest optimality criteria. The latter approach is proposed specifically for the theory of the firm when communication is limited to accounting information.

大多数经济理论都规定了均衡关系 在经济变量中，而且，至少是隐含的， 经济决策者之间的均衡信息流动。 然而，将系统移动到 通常不指定平衡位置。本研究 提出了一种方法来分析一个一般类的这种调整 流程. 本分析的主要目的是确定 最低限度的沟通和协调， 决策者需要达到平衡。 这可以 与经济活动产生的信息流相比， 研究中的机构。 如果后者小于前者， 一般来说，平衡是不可能实现的，而 关系不能可靠地近似实际经济 行为 该信息分析被提议作为新的来源 在经济模型的评估中的纪律。 当收敛到均衡需要信息时 这不能很容易地以持续的方式进行沟通，两个 提出了今后的研究方向。 第一，附加 信息可以从历史行为中推断出来， 可观察的变量，这些信息可以用于 调整过程的设计。 第二，均衡 概念可能会改变，以体现更适度的最优性 的搜索. 后一种方法是专门为 当沟通仅限于会计时的企业理论 信息.