Experimental Tests of Finite Horizon Job Search Models

本研究通过实验室实验来检验求职模型，并对现场实验数据进行计量分析，以检验实验室和现场求职行为的并行性。此外，实验数据将被用来评估已开发的计量经济学技术，以应对与自然出现的就业市场相关的有限信息问题。这些测试包括使用具有预先承诺的新实验设计和使用有限或完整的保留工资信息的计量经济学技术对保留工资属性进行直接测试。实验还将考虑到更复杂的搜索环境，其中将包括测试不同搜索强度的模型、完美和不完美的工作召回，以及未知工资分配的搜索。对有限信息计量经济学技术的评估涉及将这些方法应用于实验室数据的子集，这些数据对应于在不受控制的市场中可观察到的变量。并行性的计量检验将使用在自然产生的劳动力市场上进行的现场实验的结果，为实验室搜索行为和实际市场搜索行为的质量相似性提供经验证据。这个项目致力于用实验方法测试失业工人求职行为的理论。检验这些理论的一个关键因素是工人愿意接受一份可用的工作的最低工资。这些理论将通过利用受试者对收到的实际财务要约的反应的信息，在这一保留工资性质方面进行检验。这项研究将考察与劳动力市场相对应的环境中的行为，在劳动力市场中，个人对自己的就业前景有不完美的概念，或者他们能够改变他们寻找工作的强度。计量经济学技术已经被开发出来，用于在工人决策问题中的关键变量无法观察到的环境中分析劳动力市场数据。这些方法的有效性将通过确定应用这些技术产生的推论是否与根据实验室实验提供的更完整信息作出的推论相矛盾来评估。这个项目很重要，因为实验室实验的结果可能会为导致失业的因素提供新的线索。

This research involves laboratory experiments to test job search models and econometric analysis of field experimental data to test parallelism of laboratory and field search behavior. In addition, experimental data will be used to evaluate econometric techniques that have been developed to cope with the limited information problems associated with naturally occurring-job markets. The tests include direct tests of the reservation wage property using a new experimental design with precommitment and econometric techniques that use either limited or full information on reservation wages. Experiments will also be conducted taking into account more complicated search environments which will include tests of models with variable search intensity, perfect and imperfect job recall, and search with unknown wage offer distributions. Evaluation of the limited information econometric techniques involves application of these methods to the subset of the laboratory data that corresponds to variables that are observable in uncontrolled markets. Econometric tests of parallelism will use results from field experiments conducted in the naturally-occurring labor market to provide empirical evidence about the qualitative similarity of laboratory search behavior and actual market search behavior. $$$ This project is concerned with testing theories about the job search behavior of unemployed workers using experimental methods. A key element in testing these theories is the minimum wage a worker is willing to accept in taking an available job. These theories will be tested in terms of this reservation wage property by exploiting information on the responses of subjects to actual financial offers received. The research will examine behavior in environments corresponding to labor markets in which individuals have imperfect notions about their job offer prospects, or in which they are able to vary the intensity in which they search for jobs. Econometric techniques have been developed to analyze labor market data in environments where key variables in the worker's decision problem are unobservable. The validity of these methods will be evaluated by determining whether the inferences generated from applying these techniques are contradicted by inferences made on the basis of the more complete information provided by laboratory experiments. This project is important because the results from the laboratory experiments may shed new light on the factors contributing to unemployment.