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Auctions with Entry/Exit Decisions

Auctions with Entry/Exit Decisions
带有进入/退出决定的拍卖
批准号:
9108888
负责人:
James Cox
金额:
$6.62万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1991
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1991-08-15 至 1995-07-31

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中文摘要
翻译
自然发生的拍卖市场的特点是 投标人进入和退出的内生决定。 与此相反, 大多数先前的理论和实验研究都假设 拍卖中投标人的数量是外生的 测定 拟议的研究涉及发展理论 对具有内生进入的拍卖进行实验 退出决定。 第一个应用将是配对私人价值拍卖, 在拍卖物品的价值对于不同的拍卖物品可能不同的情况下 投标人,和共同价值拍卖,其中的价值, 拍卖物品对所有投标人都是一样的。 本申请是 受早期共同价值拍卖实验的启发, 观察到:(1)在3或4人的小团体中, 受试者的收入仅为预期利润的65%左右; (2)在6到9人的大群体中,受试者会遭受损失, 其次是破产,导致 位竞拍者. 理论和实验的目的是为了适应 将发展投标人的内生进入和退出。 新的拍卖框架将基于独立的抽签, 个体投标的机会成本。 这些将是 在公共价值和私人价值环境中使用。 配对实验共同和私人价值拍卖, 将测试新模型的含义将进行比较, 包括预测个人出入境的能力 行为 拍卖经济学的内生投标人扩展 市场将导致各种见解,并提供更多的 赢家诅咒的基本概念
英文摘要
Naturally-occurring auction markets are characterized by endogenous determination of bidder entry and exit. In contrast, most previous theoretical and experimental research has assumed that the number of bidders in an auction is exogenously determined. The proposed research involves developing the theory of and undertaking experiments for auctions with endogenous entry and exit decisions. The first application will be to paired private value auctions, where the value of an auctioned item may differ for different bidders, and to common value auctions, where the value of an auctioned item is the same for all bidders. This application is motivated by earlier experiments with common value auctions in which it was observed that: (1) in small groups of 3 or 4 people, subjects' earning were only about 65% of predicted profits; and (2) in larger groups of 6 to 9 people, subjects incurred losses, followed by bankruptcies, causing attrition in the number of bidders. Theory and experiments that are designed to accommodate endogenous entry and exit of bidders will be developed. The new auction framework will be based on independent draws of individual agents' opportunity costs of bidding. These will be used in both the common value and private value environments. Paired experiments for common and private value auctions that will test the implications of the new models will be compared, including their ability to predict individual exit and entry behavior. The endogenous-bidders extension of the economics of auction markets will lead to various insights, and provide a more fundamental conception of the winner's curse.
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  • 批准号:
    MR/R011737/1
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
    $83.41万
  • 财政年份:
    2018
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
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  • 批准号:
    G1100340/1
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
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