On the Logic of Testing Models of Cognition Through the Analysis of Brain-Damaged Performance

这一项目涉及将加拉穆尔关于证据相关性的“自举”描述应用于认知神经心理学中的方法论争论。争议的焦点是卡拉马扎的一项有影响力的主张，即大脑受损的表现只能以单案例研究的形式为认知模型提供相关证据。如果这种说法属实，那么对大脑受损表现的小组研究--特别是所有基于经典综合症类别的研究(如布罗卡氏失语症、韦尼克失语症、传导性失语症等)--作为约束竞争对手功能结构的确证或非确证证据，毫无价值。这个项目的主要目的有两个：首先，在对证据相关性的自举描述的基础上，澄清个案研究和群体研究的不同方法论作用，表现为表现上的分离、双重分离和缺陷的关联(认知神经心理学中典型的操作要素)；其次，根据本申请的详细工作，相对于其他证据相关性的帐户--例如，假设演绎帐户和贝叶斯帐户--评估自举。长期目标是对认知测试模型的逻辑进行完整的分析，作为科学一般理论建设的一个方面。

This project involves the application of Glymour's "bootstrapping" account of evidential relevance to a methodological controversy in cognitive neuropsychology. The controversy centers on an influential claim by Caramazza that brain-damaged performance can provide relevant evidence for models of cognition only in the form of single-case studies. If this claim is true, then group studies of brain-damaged performance--in particular, all studies based on the classical syndrome categories (such as Broca's aphasia, Wernicke's aphasia, conduction aphasia, etc.)--are worthless as confirmatory or disconfirmatory evidence in constraining rival functional architectures. The primary objective of this project is twofold: firstly, to clarify the different methodological roles of single-case versus group studies, as manifested in dissociations in performance, double dissociations, and associations of deficits (the typical operational elements in cognitive neuropsychology), on the basis of a bootstrapping account of evidential relevance; and secondly, to evaluate bootstrapping relative to other accounts of evidential relevance--for example, the hypothetico-deductive account and the Bayesian account--in terms of the detailed working out of this application. The long-term aim is a complete analysis of the logic of testing models of cognition, as an aspect of the general theory construction in the sciences.