U.S. Social Security Policy: A Dynamic Analysis of Incentives and Self-Selection

这项研究项目的目的是采用由本研究作者开发的退休行为的动态规划模型和其他人开发的计算策略来解决关于社会保障制度的一些重要问题。需要解决的问题包括：(1)1983年社会保障修正案的变化将如何影响退休行为？它会对老年工人的劳动力供给产生多大影响？(2)什么样的人会因为这些信用额度的增加而自我选择延迟退休信用额度？(3)新规定在精算意义上是否公平？对社会保障总支出的净影响是什么？(4)更广泛地说，有效的社会保障政策是什么形式？这些问题将通过使用从退休历史调查中获得的男性工人的数据集来估计效用函数来解决。这项研究很重要，因为它将回答有关社会保障制度变化对该制度的可行性和对接受者的好处的影响的问题。

The object of this research project is to adapt a dynamic programming model of retirement behavior developed by the author of this study and a computational strategy developed by others to address a number of important questions regarding the Social Security System. Among the questions to be addressed are: (1) How will changes in the 1983 Social Security amendments affect retirement behavior? How much will it affect the labor supply of older workers? (2) What kinds of individuals will self select delayed retirement credit because of increases in these credits? (3) Are the new rules fair in actuarial sense? What will be the net impact on total Social Security outlays? (4) More generally, what is the form of an efficient Social Security policy? These questions will be addressed by estimating utility functions with a data set of male workers taken from the Retirement History Survey. This research is important because it will answer questions about the impact of changes in the Social Security System on the viability of the system and on the benefits to recipient.