A Principal-Agent Perspective on Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interaction

最高法院位于联邦司法体系的顶端，但等级并不一定意味着控制。如果最高法院的影响实际上是最高的，规范法律理论假定下级法院必须遵循最高法院确定的司法政策。另外，委托代理理论认为，有时代理人（如巡回法院）会逃避这一责任，代表他们自己的利益，而不是代表委托人（如最高法院）的利益。尽管理解法院互动很重要，但对这一主题的研究相当有限，对委托-代理视角的关注几乎不存在。西格尔博士正在进行的理论和实证工作是向前迈出的宝贵一步。利用委托代理理论，他计划调查巡回法院执行最高法院政策的程度与它们替代自身利益的程度。具体地说，这项研究将集中于1962年至1990年的搜查和扣押案件，并审查巡回法院遵循先例的情况和审查巡回法院的判决以纠正最高法院的判决的情况。人们对最高法院的判决影响下级上诉法院法官的过程知之甚少。这项研究将大大有助于我们对这种相互作用的理解，从而有助于我们对社会司法管理的认识。

The Supreme Court is at the top of the federal judicial hierarchy, but hierarchy does not necessarily imply control. If the Supreme Court is in fact to be supreme in its impact, normative legal theory posits that inferior courts must follow judicial policy as determined by the Supreme Court. Alternatively, principal-agent theory suggests that there will be times when agents (e.g., Circuit Courts) will shirk this responsibility and represent their own interests rather than the interests of their principals (e.g., the Supreme Court). Despite the importance of understanding court interaction, research on the topic has been quite limited and attention to a principal-agent perspective virtually non-existent. The theoretical and empirical work being undertaken by Dr. Segal represents a valuable step forward. Using principal-agent theory, he plans to investigate the degree to which the circuit courts carry out Supreme Court policy versus the degree to which they substitute their own self-interest. Specifically, the study will focus on search and seizure cases from 1962 through 1990 and examine both the following of precedent by circuit courts and the reviewing of circuit court decisions to correct them by the Supreme Court. Too little is known about the processes by which Supreme Court decisions affect lower appellate court judges. This study will contribute substantially to our understanding of this interaction and thus to our knowledge of the adminstration of justice in society.