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A Principal-Agent Perspective on Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interaction

最高法院与巡回法院互动的委托代理视角

基本信息

批准号：
9112755
负责人：
Jeffrey Segal
金额：
$ 6.4万
依托单位：
SUNY at Stony Brook
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
1991
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
1991-08-01 至 1993-07-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9112755&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Principal Agent Perspective Supreme Court

项目摘要

The Supreme Court is at the top of the federal judicial hierarchy, but hierarchy does not necessarily imply control. If the Supreme Court is in fact to be supreme in its impact, normative legal theory posits that inferior courts must follow judicial policy as determined by the Supreme Court. Alternatively, principal-agent theory suggests that there will be times when agents (e.g., Circuit Courts) will shirk this responsibility and represent their own interests rather than the interests of their principals (e.g., the Supreme Court). Despite the importance of understanding court interaction, research on the topic has been quite limited and attention to a principal-agent perspective virtually non-existent. The theoretical and empirical work being undertaken by Dr. Segal represents a valuable step forward. Using principal-agent theory, he plans to investigate the degree to which the circuit courts carry out Supreme Court policy versus the degree to which they substitute their own self-interest. Specifically, the study will focus on search and seizure cases from 1962 through 1990 and examine both the following of precedent by circuit courts and the reviewing of circuit court decisions to correct them by the Supreme Court. Too little is known about the processes by which Supreme Court decisions affect lower appellate court judges. This study will contribute substantially to our understanding of this interaction and thus to our knowledge of the adminstration of justice in society.

最高法院位于联邦司法等级的最高层，但等级制度并不一定意味着控制。如果最高法院实际上具有最高的影响力，则规范性法律理论认为，下级法院必须遵循最高法院所确定的司法政策。或者，委托代理理论表明，代理人(例如，巡回法院)有时会推卸这一责任，并代表自己的利益，而不是其委托人的利益(例如，最高法院)。尽管了解法院互动很重要，但对这一主题的研究一直相当有限，几乎不存在对委托代理视角的关注。西格尔博士正在进行的理论和实证工作是向前迈出的宝贵一步。利用委托代理理论，他计划调查巡回法院在多大程度上执行最高法院的政策，以及它们在多大程度上取代了自己的自身利益。具体地说，这项研究将侧重于1962年至1990年的搜查和扣押案件，并审查巡回法院下列先例，以及最高法院审查巡回法院的裁决以纠正这些先例。人们对最高法院裁决影响下级上诉法院法官的程序知之甚少。这项研究将大大有助于我们理解这种相互作用，从而有助于我们了解社会中的司法行政。