Doctoral Dissertation Research: Rogue Agents? Judicial Decision Making at the Federal Courts of Appeals

博士论文研究：流氓特工？

• 批准号: 0719000
• 负责人: Jeffrey Segal
• 金额: $ 1.17万
• 依托单位: SUNY at Stony Brook
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-07-01 至 2009-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0719000&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Rogue; Agents

Proposal Number: 0719000Proposal Title: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Rogue Agents? Judicial Decision Making at the Federal Courts of Appeals.Principal Investigator: Jeffrey SegalCo-PI: Maxwell MakPerforming Organization: SUNY Stony BrookAbstract:This dissertation tests for whether and to what degree the Supreme Court, through its preferences and decisions, can influence the choices lower-court judges make. Truly meaningful influence requires congruence in the eventual case outcome, responsiveness to the principal's preferences, and evincing such behavior in spite of divergent preferences. If judges do indeed behave in a manner inconsistent with their own preferences, only then can the Supreme Court be seen as an adequate and effective principal of the judicial hierarchy. Examining free speech and abortion cases decided at the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I will examine how Court of Appeals decisions change as Supreme Court decisions and preferences change. The data, collected from searches on Lexis/Nexis, will be two of the more comprehensive collections of cases at the Federal Courts of Appeals in these issue areas, opening the door for research in many aspects of judicial politics. Also, the general framework is applicable to the separation of powers literature examining the dynamics of the coordinate branches of government as well as principal-agent models of bureaucracies and legislative committees. Finally, this research also has educational implications. The analytical framework of this dissertation can be used in the education and training of undergraduate and graduate students with interests in judicial politics or advanced methodology.

提案编号：0719000提案标题：博士论文研究：流氓特工？司法决策在联邦上诉法院。首席研究员：杰弗里西格尔合作伙伴：麦克斯韦马克执行机构：纽约州立大学石溪摘要：本文测试是否以及在何种程度上最高法院，通过其偏好和决定，可以影响下级法院法官的选择。 真正有意义的影响需要在最终的情况下的结果一致，响应校长的偏好，并显示这样的行为，尽管不同的偏好。 如果法官的行为确实与他们自己的偏好不一致，只有这样，最高法院才能被视为司法等级制度中适当和有效的主体。 通过研究美国上诉法院判决的言论自由和堕胎案件，我将研究上诉法院的判决如何随着最高法院的判决和偏好的变化而变化。 从Lexis/Nexis上搜索收集的数据将是联邦上诉法院在这些问题领域更全面的案例收集中的两个，为司法政治的许多方面的研究打开了大门。 此外，一般的框架是适用于权力分立的文献研究的动态协调部门的政府以及委托代理模型的官僚机构和立法委员会。 最后，本研究也具有教育意义。 本文的分析框架可用于对司法政治或高级方法感兴趣的本科生和研究生的教育和培训。