Collaborative Research: Strategic Defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court

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This research examines deviation from the principle of stare decisis, or following precedent, by appellate courts in the federal system. Deviation can take subtle forms, including distinguishing, limiting, or avoiding precedents. The goal of the research is to determine why lower courts defy (or comply with) higher courts. The research plan is to: (1) generate a random sample of U.S. Supreme Court decisions; (2) track the responses of lower courts to these decisions (the dependent variable for all the hypotheses); (3) collect data necessary to animate the independent variables; and (4) implement statistical models, testing for the influence of theoretically-critical variables. Data come from a variety of sources, including biographical materials, NSF-supported databases, judicial decisions, and periodical guides-with the final data base archived on the PI web site and with the ICPSR. The empirical findings generated here will show how specific features of the design of the federal judiciary advance or retard vertical stare decisis, revealing, at least partially, the institutional foundations of the rule of law in American courts and showing the effect of various structural incentives created by the design and operation of organizations.