Empirical Applications of Strategic Bargaining Models

战略谈判模型的实证应用

• 批准号: 9123263
• 负责人: John Kennan
• 金额: $ 3.16万
• 依托单位: University of Iowa
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-03-15 至 1993-03-01
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9123263&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Empirical; Applications; Strategic; Bargaining; Models

This project continues a line of research on bargaining behavior. The specific purpose of this study is to apply recently developed strategic theories of bargaining with private information to data on wage settlements and strike duration. The broader aim of this research is to develop a theoretical framework which is consistent with the facts, and which can eventually lead to systematic empirical analyses of important policy issues in collective bargaining. Some of these policy issues include the treatment of eligibility for unemployment compensation and other welfare benefits for striking workers, and proposals to mandate cooling off periods before a strike can commence. The core of the research is a model of repeated negotiations in which the firm has private information which includes both transient and permanent components. This model will be applied to a sequence of labor contracts negotiated by each bargaining pair with a view to explaining empirical results showing that strike incidence and duration in the last contract negotiation have a substantial effect on whether a strike occurs in the current negotiation. The model will be tested with a sample of U.S. and Canadian labor contracts.

该项目继续对讨价还价行为进行一系列研究。 本研究的具体目的是将最近发展的与私人信息讨价还价的战略理论应用于工资结算和罢工持续时间的数据。 这项研究的更广泛目标是建立一个与事实相符的理论框架，最终可以对集体谈判中的重要政策问题进行系统的实证分析。 其中一些政策问题包括如何对待罢工工人的失业补偿和其他福利资格，以及规定罢工开始前的冷静期的建议。 研究的核心是重复谈判模型，在该模型中，公司拥有私人信息，其中包括暂时的和永久的部分。 该模型将应用于每个谈判对谈判的一系列劳动合同，以解释实证结果，即上次合同谈判中的罢工发生率和持续时间对当前谈判中是否发生罢工有重大影响。 该模型将通过美国和加拿大劳动合同样本进行测试。