Tests of Strategic Bargaining Models Using Data on Strikes and Wage Settlements

该研究项目的目标是将最新的理论 谈判的经验分析， 劳动力市场的低效率，使用劳动力数据 合同. 对劳动合同的理解是至关重要的 经济政策分析的组成部分，特别是 关于失业和通货膨胀。 虽然约85%的 劳动合同是通过和平谈判达成的， 罢工威胁显然是谈判的一个重要部分 过程 该项目开发的模型认为， 罢工发生时，工会不确定有多少公司 支付得起，所以工会开始要求一个大的 工资上涨，威胁公司将不得不忍受 在工会减少其需求之前的长期罢工。 拟议研究的核心是评估是否 关于罢工持续时间和工资结算的经验数据可以 被解释为这种讨价还价冲突的结果。 一 结果的潜在应用是评估 联邦提供的调解服务的有效性， 州政府。 有潜在的重要相似之处 在罢工和其他经济和政治 冲突 显然，在以下方面观察到了效率低下的结果： 国际贸易，关税和其他壁垒阻碍 有利的交换，并在诉讼中，如果未能达成一个 和解导致昂贵的审判。 也明显 劳动承包与交换在“薄”中的联系 市场，如房地产市场，讨价还价可能 阻碍高效交易。 这些类比将不会 在拟议的研究项目中进行了系统分析，但 他们指出，对私人信息的理解 讨价还价可能会应用于许多重要的 政策问题。

The objective of the research project is to bring recent theories of bargaining to bear on empirical analyses of apparent inefficiencies in the labor market, using data on labor contracts. An understanding of labor contracts is an essential component in analyses of economic policy, particulary with respect to unemployment and inflation. Although about 85% of labor contracts are reached through peaceful negotiations, the strike threat is clearly an important part of the negotiation process. The model developed in this project asserts that strikes occur when the union is uncertain about how much the firm can afford to pay, and so the union starts by demanding a large wage increase, threatening that the firm will have to endure a long strike before the union will reduce its demand. The core of the proposed research is an assessment of whether empirical data on strike durations and wage settlements can be explained as outcomes of this kind of bargaining conflict. One potential application of the results is in evaluating the effectiveness of the mediation services provided by federal and state governments. There are potentially important similarities between strikes and other kinds of economic and political conflict. Inefficient outcomes are apparently observed in international trade, where tariffs and other barriers impede beneficial exchange, and in lawsuits, where failure to reach a settlement leads to expensive trials. There is also a clear connection between labor contracting and exchange in "thin" markets, such as the housing market, where bargaining may frustrate efficient trades. These analogies will not be systematically analyzed in the proposed research project, but they indicate that an understanding of private information bargaining is likely to have applications to many important policy questions.