Tests of Strategic Bargaining Models Using Data on Strikes and Wage Settlements

使用罢工和工资结算数据测试战略谈判模型

• 批准号: 8910930
• 负责人: John Kennan
• 金额: $ 7.97万
• 依托单位: University of Iowa
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-07-01 至 1992-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8910930&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Tests; Strategic; Bargaining; Models; Using

The objective of the research project is to bring recent theories of bargaining to bear on empirical analyses of apparent inefficiencies in the labor market, using data on labor contracts. An understanding of labor contracts is an essential component in analyses of economic policy, particulary with respect to unemployment and inflation. Although about 85% of labor contracts are reached through peaceful negotiations, the strike threat is clearly an important part of the negotiation process. The model developed in this project asserts that strikes occur when the union is uncertain about how much the firm can afford to pay, and so the union starts by demanding a large wage increase, threatening that the firm will have to endure a long strike before the union will reduce its demand. The core of the proposed research is an assessment of whether empirical data on strike durations and wage settlements can be explained as outcomes of this kind of bargaining conflict. One potential application of the results is in evaluating the effectiveness of the mediation services provided by federal and state governments. There are potentially important similarities between strikes and other kinds of economic and political conflict. Inefficient outcomes are apparently observed in international trade, where tariffs and other barriers impede beneficial exchange, and in lawsuits, where failure to reach a settlement leads to expensive trials. There is also a clear connection between labor contracting and exchange in "thin" markets, such as the housing market, where bargaining may frustrate efficient trades. These analogies will not be systematically analyzed in the proposed research project, but they indicate that an understanding of private information bargaining is likely to have applications to many important policy questions.

该研究项目的目标是利用劳动合同的数据，将最新的讨价还价理论应用于对劳动力市场明显低效的实证分析。对劳动合同的理解是经济政策分析的重要组成部分，特别是关于失业和通货膨胀的分析。尽管约85%的劳动合同是通过和平谈判达成的，但罢工威胁显然是谈判过程中的一个重要部分。在这个项目中开发的模型声称，当工会不确定公司能够支付多少工资时，就会发生罢工，因此工会一开始就要求大幅加薪，威胁说公司将不得不忍受长期罢工，工会才会减少要求。拟议研究的核心是评估罢工持续时间和工资结算的经验数据是否可以解释为这种讨价还价冲突的结果。结果的一个潜在应用是评估联邦和州政府提供的调解服务的有效性。罢工与其他类型的经济和政治冲突之间可能存在重要的相似之处。低效率的结果显然出现在国际贸易中，关税和其他壁垒阻碍了有益的交换，而在诉讼中，未能达成和解将导致代价高昂的审判。在“清淡”的市场，如住房市场，劳务合同和交换之间也有明显的联系，在那里讨价还价可能会阻碍高效的交易。这些类比不会在拟议的研究项目中进行系统分析，但它们表明，对私人信息讨价还价的理解很可能适用于许多重要的政策问题。