Tests of Strategic Bargaining Models Using Data on Strikes and Wage Settlements

该研究项目的目的是利用劳动合同数据，将最新的议价理论应用于对劳动力市场明显低效的实证分析。对劳动合同的理解是经济政策分析的一个重要组成部分，特别是在失业和通货膨胀方面。虽然约85%的劳动合同是通过和平谈判达成的，但罢工威胁显然是谈判过程的重要组成部分。在这个项目中开发的模型断言，当工会不确定公司能支付多少工资时，罢工就会发生，因此工会一开始就要求大幅加薪，威胁说在工会减少要求之前，公司将不得不忍受长时间的罢工。本研究的核心是评估关于罢工持续时间和工资解决方案的经验数据是否可以解释为这种讨价还价冲突的结果。研究结果的一个潜在应用是评估联邦和州政府提供的调解服务的有效性。罢工与其他类型的经济和政治冲突之间存在潜在的重要相似之处。在国际贸易中，关税和其他壁垒阻碍了有益的交换，在诉讼中，未能达成和解导致昂贵的审判，显然可以观察到低效的结果。在“稀薄”市场（如房地产市场）中，劳动合同和交换之间也有明显的联系，在这些市场中，讨价还价可能会阻碍有效的交易。在拟议的研究项目中不会系统地分析这些类比，但它们表明，对私人信息讨价还价的理解可能适用于许多重要的政策问题。

The objective of the research project is to bring recent theories of bargaining to bear on empirical analyses of apparent inefficiencies in the labor market, using data on labor contracts. An understanding of labor contracts is an essential component in analyses of economic policy, particulary with respect to unemployment and inflation. Although about 85% of labor contracts are reached through peaceful negotiations, the strike threat is clearly an important part of the negotiation process. The model developed in this project asserts that strikes occur when the union is uncertain about how much the firm can afford to pay, and so the union starts by demanding a large wage increase, threatening that the firm will have to endure a long strike before the union will reduce its demand. The core of the proposed research is an assessment of whether empirical data on strike durations and wage settlements can be explained as outcomes of this kind of bargaining conflict. One potential application of the results is in evaluating the effectiveness of the mediation services provided by federal and state governments. There are potentially important similarities between strikes and other kinds of economic and political conflict. Inefficient outcomes are apparently observed in international trade, where tariffs and other barriers impede beneficial exchange, and in lawsuits, where failure to reach a settlement leads to expensive trials. There is also a clear connection between labor contracting and exchange in "thin" markets, such as the housing market, where bargaining may frustrate efficient trades. These analogies will not be systematically analyzed in the proposed research project, but they indicate that an understanding of private information bargaining is likely to have applications to many important policy questions.