Fairness, Institutions and Anonymity in Bargaining Games

本研究旨在探讨讨价还价情境下的公平问题。十多年来，实验经济学家使用序步议价游戏进行研究，证明了观察到的可用盈余平均分配的趋势。这与基于自利谈判者的非合作均衡理论的预测相反。这是由于对公平结果的偏好，还是由于在社会交换的背景下产生的期望？双盲实验已经进行过了，包括实验者在内，没有人能确定是谁做了什么决定。该项目将分析这种匿名性在各种讨价还价游戏中的影响，并探索确保受试者在讨价还价情况下获得有利地位的程序。这些问题对于理解在我们的社会中观察到的自利结果的性质、环境和条件，以及理解社会环境对结果的影响，以及它们在多大程度上由于社会关系中的互惠预期而产生是至关重要的。如果是后者，那么公平竞争是建立在自身利益的基础上的，可能是脆弱的，依赖于对持续关系的期望。这种关于获得的权利对他人行为的影响的研究是财产权和市场创造中的契约的基础。

The purpose of this research is to address the issue of fairness in the context of bargaining. Over a decade of research by experimental economists using sequential-move bargaining games has documented the observed tendencies toward equal split of the available surplus. This is contrary to the predictions of noncooperative equilibrium theory based on self-interested bargainers. Is this due to a preference for fair outcomes, or is it due to expectations arising in the context of social exchange? Double blind experiments have already been run where no one, including the experimenter, can identify who made what decision. The project will analyze the effect of this anonymity in a variety of bargaining games, and explore procedures for assuring that a subject has earned the right to an advantageous position in a bargaining situation. These issues are fundamental to understanding the nature, circumstances and conditions under which self-interested outcomes are observed in our society, as well as to understanding the effect of social context on outcomes, and the extent to which they arise because of expectation of reciprocity in social relationships. If it is the latter, then fair play is based on self-interest and may be fragile and dependent upon expectations of continuing relationships. This type of research on the effect of earned rights on behavior toward others is fundamental to property rights and contracting in the creation of markets.