Collaborative Research on Principles of Constitutional and International Stability

宪法和国际稳定原则的合作研究

• 批准号: 9223185
• 负责人: Emerson Niou
• 金额: $ 5万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1993
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1993-03-01 至 1995-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9223185&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Principles; Constitutional; International

Designing a constitution involves one of the most critical and complex series of explicit decisions that a society can confront. Should the government be presidential or parliamentary; should it have a two-house or single-chamber legislature; should there be any differences in the powers of the chambers of a bicameral legislature; should representation be territorial or by proportional representation; what role should the courts play in constitutional interpretation; what provisions should be included for emergencies; what authority should be given to local and regional governments; what rights properly belong in a constitution? Large and ethnically heterogeneous states confront an additional series of questions, including: Should the country be federal or unitary, and if it is federal, should its constituent parts have the right to secede, to veto legislation, or to nullify federal law on their territories? These last questions are important not only because they influence the operation and stability of a state after it has formed, but also, as in the case of countries such as Russia and Ukraine, they can influence whether a viable constitution can be written and implemented in the first place. With various republics and regions of Russia, for example, claiming autonomy, sovereignty, and even independence and secession, it may not be possible to implement a constitution that does not provide for the right to secession. Unfortunately, we do not know very much empirically or theoretically about the implications of including a secession right in a constitution. Nor do we know the extent to which other provisions, such as allowing subunits the right to veto or nullification. Which device (secession, veto, nullification) provides a constituent unit of a federalism the greatest guarantee against violation of its rights and which, if any, fosters the development of a mutually beneficial federal state? This research investigation explores such questions by drawing a theoretical parallel between federations and alliances in international political systems. The rationale for this parallel is that alliances, like federations, must be consummated and maintained on a wholly voluntary basis. As such, alliances contain within them the right to secession and veto (and, in some instances, nullification). At the same time, in joining an alliance, each member must relinquish some of its sovereignty to a central, coordinating agent, or at least state a verbal (but possibly non-enforceable) agreement to do so. By developing some common ideas and theoretical principles, the researchers hope to show how alliances and federations operate under the same principles and how the properties of unstable alliances parallel and are different from stable and unstable federations. Finally, by looking at alliances, it is possible to gain a clearer view of the way in which the right of secession might operate in a constitutional democracy.

制定宪法涉及到一个最关键、 一个社会可能面临的一系列复杂的明确决定。 政府应该是总统制还是议会制？ 有一个两院或一院制的立法机构;如果有任何 两院制议会两院权力的差异 立法机关;代表制是否应该是地域性的， 比例代表制;法院应发挥什么作用 宪法解释;应包括哪些条款 紧急情况;应给予地方和 区域政府;什么权利适当地属于一个 宪法？ 各大民族国家面临着另一个挑战， 一系列问题，包括：国家应该是联邦还是 单一制，如果是联邦制，其组成部分是否应 脱离联邦、否决立法或废除联邦法律的权利 在他们的领土上？ 最后这些问题不仅重要， 因为它们影响一个国家的运作和稳定， 它已经形成，但也像俄罗斯这样的国家一样， 和乌克兰，他们可以影响一个可行的宪法是否可以 首先要写好并实施。 与各种 俄罗斯的共和国和地区，例如，声称自治， 主权，甚至独立和分裂，它可能不是 可能实施的宪法，不提供 分裂的权利。 不幸的是，我们不知道很多经验或 从理论上讲， 在宪法中。 我们也不知道在多大程度上， 规定，如允许下属单位行使否决权或 无效 哪种手段（分离、否决、废除） 为联邦制的组成单位提供了最大的保障 其权利受到侵犯，如果有， 建立一个互惠互利的联邦国家 这项研究调查探讨了这些问题，通过绘制一个 理论上的联盟和联盟之间的平行 国际政治制度。 这种平行的基本原理 联盟，就像联邦一样，必须完善， 在完全自愿的基础上进行。 因此，联盟包含 在他们内部，分裂和否决权（在一些国家， 的情况下，无效）。 同时，在加入一个 联盟，每个成员必须放弃一些主权， 中央，协调代理，或至少说明口头（但 可能无法执行）的协议。 通过开发一些 共同的想法和理论原则，研究人员希望， 展示联盟和联合会如何在同一个 原则以及不稳定联盟的性质如何与 并且不同于稳定的和不稳定的联邦。 最后， 通过观察联盟，可以更清楚地了解 分离权在一个国家的运作方式 宪政民主。