The Political Economy of Natural Resource Use in Developing Countries: Selected Studies

本研究的目的是分析发展中国家不安全的所有权或财产权对自然资源使用的影响。所有权不安全的一个原因是不稳定的政治和法律制度。将进行若干实证研究，以探讨政治波动的措施与自然资源开发和开采之间的关系。开发模型以确定不安全所有权对开发资源的激励、对开采资本的投资以及对资源回收时间的影响。经验性研究将集中于商业采伐造成的毁林模式、投资人工林的动机、从森林获得的商业产品的混合、发展中国家矿物燃料勘探的程度以及矿物燃料资源开采的速度。不同国家和不同时期的政治制度稳定性数据被用来表明所有权安全。此外，还将分析所有权不安全对涉及自然和环境资产的交易频率和结构的影响。将要研究的交易是债务换资源，以及涉及化石燃料勘探和开发权的合同。

The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of insecure ownership or property rights on the use of natural resources in the developing world. One cause of ownership insecurity is volatile political and legal regimes. Several empirical studies will be undertaken to explore the relationships between measures of political volatility and natural resource development and extraction. Models are developed to identify the effect of insecure ownership on incentives to develop resources, on investment in extraction capital, and on the timing of resource recovery. The empirical studies will focus on the pattern of deforestation that results from commercial logging, the incentive to invest in plantation forests, the mix of commercial products obtained from forests, the extent of fossil fuel exploration in developing countries, and the rate at which fossil fuel resources are extracted. Data on the stability of political institutions, across countries and over time, are used to indicate ownership security. In addition, the effect of ownership insecurity on the frequency and structure of transactions involving natural and environmental assets will also be analyzed. The transactions to be studied are debt-for-resource swaps and contracts involving exploration and development rights for fossil fuels.