The Political Economy of Environment-Development Relationships

环境与发展关系的政治经济学

• 批准号: 9808696
• 负责人: Robert Deacon
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Barbara
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-11-15 至 2003-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9808696&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Political; Economy; Environment; Development; Relationships

The primary goal of this project is to better understand the relationship between economic growth, democracy, and environmental quality. This is now a prominent policy question. Decision makers in domestic and international agencies need to know how political reform and accelerating growth in some of the world's poorest nations will affect the global environment. Theoretical models show that the relationship between growth in income and pollution could be positive or negative. Increasing production causes more pollution to be generated, but higher income can intensify demands for environmental protection. Empirical research on this subject indicates that several forms of pollution seem to decline with economic growth once a country's income reaches a certain level. Research on this topic has largely ignored the fact that pollution control is a public good, provided by government. One consequence of this is that results from prior research on the growth environmental quality relationship may be flawed because they confound the environmental effects of economic growth with the effects of political reform. That is, some of the environmental effects attributed to growth may actually be due to cross country variations in political institutions. A second consequence is that the profession is uninformed about the environmental effects of political change, and thus can offer no credible insights on the environmental implications of the recent trend toward democratization or on kinds of political reforms that are likely to foster environmental protection. These are serious shortcomings in light the fact that political institutions in some of the world's poorest nations have changed profoundly during the last decade and some are now growing vigorously. This project will develop a theoretical model of public goods provision under non-democratic government, and estimate it empirically. The public good of primary concern here is environmental protection. Preliminary inquiry, and the received literature on public choice, gives some indication that non democratic regimes are likely to under provide public goods relative to democracies because they fail to represent the interests of some segments of the population, and accordingly ignore benefits accruing to these non represented groups in making policy. This will serve as the starting point for a thorough theoretical investigation of public goods provision in non-democratic government. The resulting model will then be incorporated in a general equilibrium framework that (i) relates a country's environmental policy to its income and form of government, (ii) relates pollution levels to environmental policy, economy wide output, and the composition of output, and (iii) relates the composition of output to income and environmental policy. The main objective is to estimate all components of this model empirically. The form of government in a given country and year will be characterized with information on its method of selecting the chief executive (elective vs. non elective,) the type of chief executive (president, premier, monarch, military ruler, etc.), the degree of party competition, the effectiveness of the legislature (effective, ineffective, non existent,) and similar variables. Levels of environmental pollution will be represented with data from monitoring sites in a wide range of countries and years on levels of sulfur dioxide, smoke, and heavy particulates. Cross country differences in levels of several of water pollutants and provision of such environmentally related public goods as access to sanitation facilities, safe drinking water, and public health will be examined in the same fashion. The analysis of output composition will be structured to incorporate those industries most responsible for generating specific pollutants. For example, the primary man made SO2sources are fossil fuel combustion (for electricity production, home heating, and transportation,) metal refining, and certain industrial processes, so these industries must be represented individually. With empirical estimates of the relevant relationships, it will be possible to more accurately assess the separate effects of political reform and economic growth on the environment.

该项目的主要目标是更好地理解经济增长、民主和环境质量之间的关系。这是一个突出的政策问题。国内和国际机构的决策者需要了解世界上一些最贫穷国家的政治改革和加速增长将如何影响全球环境。理论模型表明，收入增长与污染之间的关系可能是正的，也可能是负的。增加生产会产生更多的污染，但更高的收入会增加对环境保护的要求。对这一问题的实证研究表明，一旦一个国家的收入达到一定水平，几种形式的污染似乎会随着经济增长而减少。关于这个主题的研究在很大程度上忽视了污染控制是政府提供的公共产品这一事实。这样做的后果之一是，以前关于增长环境质量关系的研究结果可能是有缺陷的，因为它们混淆了经济增长的环境影响与政治改革的影响。也就是说，一些归因于经济增长的环境效应实际上可能是由于政治制度的跨国差异。第二个后果是，该专业不了解政治变革对环境的影响，因此无法就最近的民主化趋势或可能促进环境保护的政治改革的环境影响提供可信的见解。鉴于世界上一些最贫穷国家的政治体制在过去十年中发生了深刻变化，有些国家的政治体制现在正在蓬勃发展，这些都是严重的缺陷。本研究将建立一个非民主政府下公共物品供给的理论模型，并进行实证分析。这里首要关注的公共利益是环境保护。初步调查，以及收到的文献上的公共选择，给出了一些迹象表明，非民主政权很可能提供公共产品相对于民主国家，因为他们不能代表人口的某些部分的利益，因此忽略了这些非代表性群体在制定政策的好处。这将作为一个出发点，在非民主政府的公共产品提供的彻底的理论研究。由此产生的模型，然后将被纳入一个一般均衡框架，（一）涉及一个国家的环境政策，其收入和政府的形式，（二）涉及污染水平的环境政策，经济范围内的输出，和输出的组成，和（三）涉及输出的组成，收入和环境政策。主要目标是根据经验估计该模型的所有组成部分。在一个特定的国家和年份的政府形式将与其选择行政长官的方法（选举与非选举），行政长官的类型（总统，总理，君主，军事统治者等），政党竞争的程度、立法机构的有效性（有效、无效、不存在）和类似的变量。环境污染水平将通过来自许多国家和年份的二氧化硫、烟雾和重颗粒物水平监测点的数据来表示。将以同样的方式审查若干水污染物水平的跨国差异以及与环境有关的公共产品的提供情况，如获得卫生设施、安全饮用水和公共卫生。产出构成分析的结构将包括那些对产生特定污染物负有最大责任的工业。例如，主要的人为SO2来源是化石燃料燃烧（用于发电，家庭供暖和运输），金属精炼和某些工业过程，因此这些行业必须单独表示。通过对相关关系的经验性估计，可以更准确地评估政治改革和经济增长对环境的单独影响。