Information, Participation and Representation: An Economic Analysis of Collective Action

9308405， PI-Lohmann：这项研究解决了两个通常与集体行动相关的问题。首先，政治结果倾向于有利于组织良好的小群体，而不利于分散的大群体。作为一种解释，人们常常认为，在克服集体行动的搭便车问题方面，较小的群体更成功。其次，集体行动可能会削弱特定监管政策的可信度。当企业预期监管环境可能会因利益集团和公众压力而改变时，它们可能不愿投入资源。迄今为止，对这两个问题的分析是基于简化形式的政治参与和决策模型。本项目将运用博弈论技术明确推导出人们组织起来的动机和决策者应对压力的动机。这项工作将确定影响政治结果效率的因素以及监管政策的政治设计中固有的权衡。

9308405, PI-Lohmann: This research addresses two problems commonly associated with collective action. First, political outcomes tend to be biased in favor of small, well-organized groups and against large, diffuse groups. As an explanation, it is often argued that smaller groups are more successful in overcoming the free rider problem of collective action. Second, collective action may undermine the credibility of particular regulatory policies. Firms may have disincentives to commit resources when they anticipate that the regulatory environment may change in response to interest groups and public pressures. To date the analysis of these two problems is based on reduced-form models of political participation and decision-making. This project will employ game theoretical techniques to explicitly derive people's incentives to become organized and policymakers' incentives to respond to their pressures. This work will identify the factors affecting the efficiency of political outcomes and the tradeoffs inherent in the political design of regulatory policy.