The Market for Congressional Votes

国会选票市场

• 批准号: 9422755
• 负责人: Thomas Stratmann
• 金额: $ 4.31万
• 依托单位: Montana State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-05-15 至 1997-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9422755&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Market; Congressional; Votes

9422755 Stratmann This project introduces a new approach in studying whether campaign contributions are used to influence legislative decisions. If Political Action Committees (PACs) contribute to legislators in exchange for a vote favoring their interest, legislators, who are expected to vote against constituency interests, have incentives to both accept contributions and to cheat on the vote-for-money agreement. Contracts between PACs and legislators are not legally enforceable - no third party penalizes reneging or cheating. One expects that in the absence of a third party enforcer of vote-for-money contracts, market arrangements are sought, providing a cheap method to guarantee contract performance. This project is an empirical examination of those market arrangements. This project focusses on time patterns of contributions and whether these patterns are consistent with the hypothesis of a quid pro quo between legislators and PACs: it is shown that legislators who have incentives to cheat on an agreement with a PAC, specifying a vote-for-money exchange, are expected to receive contributions after performance of the agreed to task. The project is a study of the timing of contributions by PACs representing a number of industries. Detailed, previously unemployed data, specifying the date on which contributions were received by legislators, will be used in this project. Patterns of contributions over the entire election cycle will be examined and related to Congressional votes, primaries, and general elections. The distribution of contributions in months prior and after Congressional votes will be analyzed. Legislators who have incentives to renege on a vote-for-money contract are expected to receive contributions after the vote- if they voted in a PAC's interest. Differences in contribution patterns for votes that could be well anticipated and votes that could not be as well anticipated, will be examined. Further, leads and lags of election yea r contributions will be studied; for example, whether contributions in 1986 (an election year) reflected votes in 1985 or influenced votes in 1987.

小行星9422755 该项目介绍了一种新的方法来研究竞选捐款是否被用来影响立法决定。 如果政治行动委员会（Political Action Committees，PAC）向立法者捐款，以换取有利于他们利益的投票，那么立法者（预计将投票反对选区利益）就有动机接受捐款并在投票换金钱协议上作弊。 政治行动委员会和立法者之间的合同在法律上是不可执行的--没有第三方惩罚食言或欺骗。 人们预计，在没有第三方执行投票换金钱合同的情况下，将寻求市场安排，提供一种廉价的方法来保证合同的履行。 本项目是对这些市场安排的实证研究。 该项目的重点是时间模式的贡献，以及这些模式是否与立法者和PAC之间的交换条件的假设是一致的：它表明，立法者谁有动机欺骗与PAC的协议，指定一个投票换金钱的交流，预计将收到的贡献后，商定的任务的性能。 该项目是对代表若干行业的政治行动委员会捐款时间的研究。 在这个项目中将使用详细的、以前未使用的数据，具体说明立法者收到捐款的日期。 整个选举周期的捐款模式将被审查，并与国会投票，初选和大选有关。 将分析国会投票前后几个月的捐款分布情况。 如果立法者投票是为了PAC的利益，那么他们有动力违背投票换金钱合同的立法者预计将在投票后收到捐款。 将审查可以很好地预期的投票和不能很好地预期的投票的贡献模式的差异。 此外，将研究选举是的捐款的领先和滞后;例如，1986年（选举年）的捐款是否反映了1985年的选票或影响了1987年的选票。