Matching in Centralized and Decentralized Labor Markets

9507791罗斯这一建议是平行的理论和实证研究的匹配过程中进行集中和分散的劳动力市场。 它建立在先前NSF支持下进行的调查基础上。 到目前为止，研究的理论部分集中在“双边匹配”模型上。 到目前为止，调查的实证部分包括对美国医生入门级劳动力市场的研究（包括进入专业）和在英国（在国家卫生服务的每个地区都有不同的组织市场），以及律师的入门级劳动力市场（在法律合伙企业和联邦法院担任助理职位;美国和加拿大的“文章”职位），牙医（特别是口腔外科医生，但也包括儿科牙医和牙周病医生），临床心理学家和日本精英大学的新毕业生。 人们还研究了非劳动力市场的匹配过程，例如美国女生联谊会和兄弟会的（不同）招聘过程，以及大学橄榄球季后赛市场。 在最近的调查中，最突出的实证发现是，在历史上，每个市场都有一段时期，表现出交易时间的分散（“抢着行动”）现象，在这种现象中，市场交易随着竞争的到来而越来越早，导致了各种各样的市场失灵。 这些不同市场中的每一个目前的制度结构，其组织范围从几乎完全分散到几乎完全集中，在很大程度上是对这段历史的回应。 过去的工作集中在分析和比较采用集中市场清算机制的入门级市场。 本研究旨在分析分散的劳动力市场，入门级和高级，并比较其运作和匹配效率与其他分散的市场和集中的。 市场清算和分散市场的有效长度，即市场保持开放的时间，个人报价保持开放的时间，以及在前一个报价被拒绝后需要多长时间才能提出新的报价;去中心化市场作为具有随机元素的匹配过程，例如当不止一家公司试图通过电话联系给定候选人时，哪家公司首先通过电话联系给定候选人;改进现有市场和设计新的市场，以便更好地了解不同的市场规章如何相互结合起来发挥作用，以及在计算机辅助市场等特定情况下，这些规章单独和共同产生何种激励和抑制作用;高级劳动力市场，即高度分散的市场，在这种市场中，企业和工人开始匹配，而这种匹配会因退休而不稳定，创建新的职位;以及向个别市场参与者提供建议，例如学生医生是否通过透露她对医院的真实偏好顺序来满足自身利益。

9507791 Roth This proposal is for parallel theoretical and empirical investigations into the matching processes which go on in centralized and decentralized labor markets. It builds on an investigation carried out with prior NSF support. The theoretical part of the investigation has so far focused on "two-sided matching" models. The empirical part of the investigation has so far included studies of the entry level labor markets for physicians in the US (including entry into specialties) and in Britain (where differently organized markets operate in each region of the National Health service), as well as entry level labor markets for lawyers (for associate positions in law partnerships and clerkships in Federal courts in ;the US, and for "articling" positions in Canada), dentists (particularly oral surgeons but also pediatric dentists and periodontists), clinical psychologists, and new graduates of elite Japanese universities. Matching processes which are not labor markets have also been studied, such as the (different) recruitment processes of American sororities and fraternities, and the market for post-season college football bowls. The most striking empirical discovery of the recent part of the investigation is that each of these markets has a period in its history which exhibited the phenomenon of unraveling of transaction times ("jumping the gun"), in which market transactions came earlier and earlier in response to competition, resulting in various types of market failure. The present institutional structure of each of these diverse markets, whose organizations range from almost completely decentralized to almost completely centralized, is in substantial part a response to this history. The past work concentrated on the analysis and comparison of entry level marketq which employ centralized market clearing mechanisms. The present investigation is intended to analyze decentralized labor markets, both entry level and senior level, and compare their operation and matching effectiv eness both with other decentralized markets and with centralized ones. The five broad lines of inquiry in the current project can be summarized as: Market clearing and the effective length of a decentralized market namely how long the market remains open, how long individual offers remain open, and how long it takes to make a new offer after a previous offer has been rejected; Decentralized markets as matching processes with random elements such as which firm reaches a given candidate first by telephone, when more than one is trying to do so; Improving existing markets and designing new ones in order to better understand how different market regulations work in combination with each other, and what incentives and disincentives they create singly and together in particular contexts such as computer assisted markets; Senior level labor markets namely highly decentralized markets in which firms and workers begin matched and matchings are destabilized by retirements and the creation of new positions; and Advice to individual market participants such as whether or not a student physician's self-interest is served by revealing her true preference order for hospitals.