EHP: Market Culture, Performance, and the Timing of Transactions

EHP：市场文化、绩效和交易时机

• 批准号: 0338619
• 负责人: Alvin Roth
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-07-15 至 2010-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0338619&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: EHP; Market; Culture; Performance; Timing

This project will investigate matching processes in centralized and decentralized labor markets, and other matching markets, such as college admissions. The goal is to better understand labor markets, and how efficiently they match people with positions (and incidentally how much incentive they give students to prepare themselves for positions). The empirical part of the investigation will include entry level labor markets for physicians in the U.S. (including both first positions, and specialties, such as gastroenterology) and in Britain, as well as entry level labor markets for lawyers (with particular attention to clerkships in Federal appellate courts in the U.S., and for "articling" positions in Canada), dentists, clinical psychologists, and new graduates of elite Japanese universities. Past work has shown that each of these markets had a period in its history which exhibited the phenomenon of unraveling of transaction times ("jumping the gun"), in which market transactions became earlier and earlier in response to competition, resulting in various types of market failure. The present institutional structure of each of these diverse markets, whose organizations range from almost completely centralized to almost completely decentralized, is in substantial part a response to this history. The project will analyze the informal rules by which markets are organized, and how these interact with supply and demand to affect the timing of transactions. Even decentralized markets may have elaborate, sometimes explicit rules and norms about how and when offers will be made, accepted and rejected. For example, in some labor markets, it is conventional for employers to make exploding offers, to which candidates must reply before receiving other offers, while in other markets it is customary for all offers to remain open long enough to allow candidates to compare multiple offers. Similarly, norms differ concerning the circumstances under which a candidate may honorably change his mind about an offer he has accepted. These differences can influence who makes offers to whom, at what time, and what outcome is produced. This investigation proposes to explore these issues and how they impact particular markets) using field observation, laboratory experiments, and game theoretic models.The results of the present study should help illuminate recent developments in markets that have experienced timing problems, such as the market for clerks for appellate judges, college and graduate admissions, and entry into medical specialties and subspecialties. Loosely speaking, these markets serve their participants best when they allow efficient matching, e.g. when the best applicants are matched to the best positions, and the results will have implications for how market performance in this respect can be improved.

该项目将调查集中式和分散式劳动力市场以及其他匹配市场（例如大学招生）的匹配流程。 目标是更好地了解劳动力市场，以及他们如何有效地将人员与职位相匹配（顺便说一句，他们给予学生多少激励来为自己的职位做好准备）。调查的实证部分将包括美国和英国医生（包括第一职位和胃肠病学等专业）的入门级劳动力市场，以及律师（特别关注美国联邦上诉法院的书记员职位和加拿大的“文章”职位）、牙医、临床心理学家和日本精英大学应届毕业生的入门级劳动力市场。 过去的研究表明，这些市场在其历史上都曾经历过一段时期，表现出交易时间混乱（“操之过急”）的现象，即市场交易因竞争而变得越来越早，从而导致各种类型的市场失灵。这些不同市场目前的制度结构，其组织范围从几乎完全集中到几乎完全分散，在很大程度上是对这段历史的回应。该项目将分析市场组织的非正式规则，以及这些规则如何与供需相互作用以影响交易时间。 即使去中心化的市场也可能有关于如何以及何时提出、接受和拒绝报价的详细的、有时是明确的规则和规范。例如，在某些劳动力市场中，雇主通常会提出爆炸式的聘用合同，求职者必须在收到其他聘用合同之前回复这些聘用合同，而在其他市场，所有的聘用合同通常都会保持足够长的时间，以便候选人可以比较多个聘用合同。同样，关于候选人在何种情况下可以光荣地改变对他已接受的提议的想法的规范也有所不同。这些差异会影响谁向谁提出要约、何时提出以及产生什么结果。本调查旨在利用现场观察、实验室实验和博弈论模型来探讨这些问题以及它们如何影响特定市场。本研究的结果应有助于阐明经历过时机问题的市场的最新发展，例如上诉法官文员市场、大学和研究生招生市场、以及进入医学专业和亚专业的市场。宽松地说，当这些市场允许有效匹配时，它们可以为参与者提供最好的服务，例如当最好的申请者与最佳职位相匹配时，其结果将对如何提高这方面的市场表现产生影响。