Dynamic Economies and Boundly Rational Agents

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; R o o t E n t r y F V N @ C o m p O b j b W o r d D o c u m e n t O b j e c t P o o l v N v N 4 @ & ! " # $ % ' ( ) * + , - . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 : ; = ? @ A B C D E F G H F Microsoft Word 6.0 Document MSWordDoc Word.Document.6 ; e = e p p p p p p p 5 1 f T ; 5 p 5 p p p p p p p p . David Kreps Stanford University SBR-9511208 This proposal consists of four related projects. The first project is joint with Drew Fudenberg and involves the completion of ongoing research on boundedly rational learning in games. The second project aims to provide an axiomatic approach to uncertainty aversion -- the tendency of people to avoid situations in which the probabilities of different outcomes are unknown-- and to link it with satisficing behavior. This work could help account for such puzzles as the Ellsberg paradox. The third project is joint with Bent Holmstrom and will seek to provide a theoretical foundation to the prevalence of unsecured promises in social transactions. The fourth project is a dynamic extension of previous work by the P.I. on unforeseen contingencies. ; Oh +' 0 ( L p $ H l C:\WORDTEMP\NORMAL.DOT David Kreps Luis Fernandez Luis S u m m a r y I n f o r m a t i o n ( Fernandez @ Y N @ @ Y N @ Microsoft Word 6.0 1 - . ! ! ! K @ Normal a c " A@ " Default Paragraph Font . Luis Fernandez C:\ZZ\DECS95\AWARD\KREPS.ABS @Canon BJ-200 LPT1: BJ200 Canon BJ-200 D L f E h h d d # Canon BJ-200 D L f E h h d d # 1 Times New Roman Symbol & Arial " h R % R % ; David Kreps Luis Fernandez Luis Fernandez ;