Dynamic Games, Reputation, and the Theory of the Firm

动态博弈、声誉和企业理论

• 批准号: 8707874
• 负责人: David Kreps
• 金额: $ 9.23万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-07-01 至 1989-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8707874&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dynamic; Games; Reputation; Theory; Firm

This is pathbreaking research that has already reshaped and advanced the economics of information, finance, decision theory, game theory and industrial organization theory. For example, under the previous grant the investigator developed a conceptual framework for sequential equilibria which everyone now uses; launched a major new branch of signalling theory; defined a new way of representing bargaining among a large number of opponents; and obtained many subtle but important insights into the way reputation affects business behavior. Renewed support permits the investigator to pursue an ambitious research agenda in these areas. Specifically, the agenda includes (1) the study of models of reputation where the party holding the reputation is not subject to perfect monitoring; (2) investigation of whether in such models, it is possible that unverifiable but useful information will go entirely unused; (3) further study of organizations as reputation bearers, focusing on models where a number of parties share and affect a reputation contemporaneously; and (4) the development of models of dynamic choice with unforeseen contingencies, the use of these models to study dynamic bilateral relationships, and a comparison of those models with neoclassical models of dynamic choice.

这是一项开创性的研究， 信息经济学，金融学，决策论，博弈论 产业组织理论。 例如，根据以前的 格兰特研究人员开发了一个概念框架， 现在每个人都在使用的顺序均衡;推出了一个主要的新 信号理论的分支;定义了一种新的表示方法 在众多的反对者中讨价还价，并获得了许多 关于声誉如何影响 商业行为。 新的支持使调查人员能够进行雄心勃勃的调查， 这些领域的研究课题。 具体而言，议程包括 (1)信誉模型的研究，其中一方持有 声誉没有受到完善的监督;（2）调查 无论是在这样的模型中， 信息将完全无用;（3）进一步研究 组织作为声誉承担者，重点放在模型， 同时共享和影响声誉的当事人数量; （4）发展了具有不可预见性的动态选择模型 突发事件，使用这些模型来研究动态双边 关系，以及这些模型与新古典主义的比较 动态选择模型。