Dynamic Games, Reputation, and the Theory of the Firm

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This is pathbreaking research that has already reshaped and advanced the economics of information, finance, decision theory, game theory and industrial organization theory. For example, under the previous grant the investigator developed a conceptual framework for sequential equilibria which everyone now uses; launched a major new branch of signalling theory; defined a new way of representing bargaining among a large number of opponents; and obtained many subtle but important insights into the way reputation affects business behavior. Renewed support permits the investigator to pursue an ambitious research agenda in these areas. Specifically, the agenda includes (1) the study of models of reputation where the party holding the reputation is not subject to perfect monitoring; (2) investigation of whether in such models, it is possible that unverifiable but useful information will go entirely unused; (3) further study of organizations as reputation bearers, focusing on models where a number of parties share and affect a reputation contemporaneously; and (4) the development of models of dynamic choice with unforeseen contingencies, the use of these models to study dynamic bilateral relationships, and a comparison of those models with neoclassical models of dynamic choice.