Dynamic Models of Bounded Rationally

有界有理动态模型

• 批准号: 8908402
• 负责人: David Kreps
• 金额: $ 10.95万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-07-15 至 1992-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8908402&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Dynamic; Models; Bounded; Rationally

Economic theory is frequently criticized for assuming that economic agents are always rational. But economic theories based on more realistic assumptions about the way individuals decide have not been very productive. The results from these "realistic" theories are sensitive to specific assumptions about the decision rules used by agents. This project promises to bridge the gap between traditional rational choice economic models and models based on more realistic decision rules. In this project adaptive, heuristic decision rules emerge from individually rational behavior under imperfect information. Behavior predicted by the models of dynamic choice developed in this project conform to observed behavior, but the results are rigorously derived from general assumptions and yield useful insights. There are two parts to this project. In the first, models are studied in which individuals play a game repeatedly, learning and experimenting as they go. A wide class of behavioral rules are shown to yield convergence to Nash equilibria. Restrictions on individual behavior are related to various Nash equilibrium refinements. This is important because Nash equilibria and Nash refinements are mathematically tractable. This part of the project could provide economic theorists with powerful mathematical tools for studying dynamic models of bounded rationality. In the second part, models are developed in which individuals have a general preference for flexibility because they know there are future contingencies they cannot foresee. Dynamic game theory and contract theory are used to study individual choice where the desire for flexibility changes with circumstances. This project should be supported because of its contributions to economic theory and decision theory. Methodologically the project should provide economists with new approaches to modelling dynamic choice in a changing economy. Substantively, the applications of the investigator's approaches to economic problems, especially his work in the first part of the project on models of experimentation and learning, should provide important new insights into a wide range of economic issues.

经济理论经常被批评为假设， 经济主体总是理性的。 但是经济学理论 关于个人决定的方式的更现实的假设 并不是很有成效。 结果从这些 “现实主义”理论对以下具体假设很敏感： 代理人使用的决策规则。 该项目承诺， 弥合传统理性选择经济学 模型和基于更现实的决策规则的模型。 在 这个项目的自适应，启发式决策规则出现， 不完全信息下的个体理性行为 年开发的动态选择模型预测的行为 这个项目符合观察到的行为，但结果是 从一般假设中严格推导出来， 见解. 这个项目有两个部分。 首先，模型是 研究中，人们反复玩一个游戏，学习和 边走边做实验 行为规则有很多种， 证明收敛到纳什均衡。 限制 个人行为与各种纳什均衡有关 改进。 这很重要因为纳什均衡和纳什均衡 改进在数学上是容易处理的。 这部分 该项目可以为经济理论家提供强有力的 数学工具，用于研究有界 理性 在第二部分中，开发了模型，其中个人 我一般都喜欢灵活性，因为他们知道 是他们无法预见的未来突发事件 动态博弈 理论和契约理论来研究个体选择 对灵活性的渴望随着环境的变化而变化。 该项目应得到支持，因为它有助于 经济理论和决策理论。 方法论上， 项目应该为经济学家提供新的方法， 在不断变化的经济中模拟动态选择。 实质上， 研究者的经济方法的应用 问题，特别是他在项目第一部分的工作， 实验和学习的模式，应该提供重要的 对广泛的经济问题的新见解。