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Dynamic Models of Bounded Rationally

Dynamic Models of Bounded Rationally
有界有理动态模型
批准号:
8908402
负责人:
David Kreps
金额:
$10.95万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1989
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1989-07-15 至 1992-12-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
经济理论经常因为假设经济主体总是理性的而受到批评。但是,基于对个人决策方式的更现实假设的经济理论并不是很有成效。这些“现实”理论的结果对有关代理人使用的决策规则的特定假设很敏感。该项目承诺弥合传统理性选择经济模型和基于更现实的决策规则的模型之间的差距。在这个项目中,不完全信息下的个体理性行为产生了自适应的启发式决策规则。本项目中开发的动态选择模型预测的行为与观察到的行为一致,但结果严格来自一般假设并产生有用的见解。这个项目包括两个部分。首先,研究的是模型,在这些模型中,每个人反复玩一个游戏,边玩边学习和实验。一大类行为规则被证明是收敛于纳什均衡的。对个人行为的限制与各种纳什均衡改进有关。这一点很重要,因为纳什均衡和纳什精化在数学上是容易处理的。该项目的这一部分可以为经济理论家提供强大的数学工具,用于研究有限理性的动态模型。在第二部分中,建立了模型,在这些模型中,个人普遍倾向于灵活性,因为他们知道未来存在他们无法预见的意外情况。动态博弈论和契约理论被用来研究个体选择,其中对灵活性的渴望随着环境的变化而变化。这个项目应该得到支持,因为它对经济理论和决策理论做出了贡献。在方法上,该项目应该为经济学家提供新的方法,以模拟在不断变化的经济中的动态选择。实质上,研究人员对经济问题的方法的应用,特别是他在实验和学习模型项目第一部分中的工作,应该会为广泛的经济问题提供重要的新见解。
英文摘要
Economic theory is frequently criticized for assuming that economic agents are always rational. But economic theories based on more realistic assumptions about the way individuals decide have not been very productive. The results from these "realistic" theories are sensitive to specific assumptions about the decision rules used by agents. This project promises to bridge the gap between traditional rational choice economic models and models based on more realistic decision rules. In this project adaptive, heuristic decision rules emerge from individually rational behavior under imperfect information. Behavior predicted by the models of dynamic choice developed in this project conform to observed behavior, but the results are rigorously derived from general assumptions and yield useful insights. There are two parts to this project. In the first, models are studied in which individuals play a game repeatedly, learning and experimenting as they go. A wide class of behavioral rules are shown to yield convergence to Nash equilibria. Restrictions on individual behavior are related to various Nash equilibrium refinements. This is important because Nash equilibria and Nash refinements are mathematically tractable. This part of the project could provide economic theorists with powerful mathematical tools for studying dynamic models of bounded rationality. In the second part, models are developed in which individuals have a general preference for flexibility because they know there are future contingencies they cannot foresee. Dynamic game theory and contract theory are used to study individual choice where the desire for flexibility changes with circumstances. This project should be supported because of its contributions to economic theory and decision theory. Methodologically the project should provide economists with new approaches to modelling dynamic choice in a changing economy. Substantively, the applications of the investigator's approaches to economic problems, especially his work in the first part of the project on models of experimentation and learning, should provide important new insights into a wide range of economic issues.
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会议论文
Conference on Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, 1998-2000
Dynamic Economies and Boundly Rational Agents
  • 批准号:
    9511208
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $21.48万
  • 财政年份:
    1995
  • 负责人:
    David Kreps
  • 依托单位:
Conference on Econometrics and Mathematical Economics (1993-1995), Cambridge MA
Studies in Dynamic Economies with Boundedly Rational Agents
  • 批准号:
    9208954
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $21.33万
  • 财政年份:
    1992
  • 负责人:
    David Kreps
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Scalable Learning and Optimization: High-dimensional Models and Online Decision-Making Strategies for Big Data Analysis
新型手性NAD(P)H Models合成及生化模拟