Studies in Dynamic Economies with Boundedly Rational Agents

有限理性主体的动态经济研究

• 批准号: 9208954
• 负责人: David Kreps
• 金额: $ 21.33万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-07-01 至 1995-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9208954&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Studies; Dynamic; Economies; Boundedly; Rational

Four specific topics will be covered in this research. (1) Axiomatic models of choice in the face of unforeseen contingencies will be developed, with emphasis given to models of dynamic choice and choice in multiperson settings. The objective would be to establish axioms that represent rational preferences when the decisionmaker is unsure of what future contingencies are even possible, much less which will occur. (2) Efficient contractual forms in the presence of unforeseen contingencies will be analyzed, emphasizing how bilateral, relational contracts will change with changes in the knowledge the parties have about each other's preferences and future contingencies. (3) The impact of unforeseen contingencies on liability insurance will be studied, emphasizing the second best form of liability insurance in the face of limited liability laws. (4) The creation of a notion of similarity between different situations through the use of cheap talk will be investigated, where one party simply declares one situation to be similar to others. The questions are when such declarations will be credible and whether such a situation can arise naturally through a heuristic learning process. An important general theme of this research, more apparent in the first three topics than in the fourth, is how individuals adapt and equilibria are constructed in contexts where the individuals are constantly confronted with situations that their earlier plans did not anticipate. This is a hallmark of global, as well as more local, change; how do individuals, economies, and societies adapt to an environment in which the rules and conditions are always changing? How, for example, should we proceed in the face of the greenhouse effect, where there is honest controversy as to what the eventual consequences of various actions (or inactions) will be? How should national economies construct their trade relations, a context in which there are clear choices to be made between bilateral and tri- or multi-lateral contracting forms, and the different countries are constantly working out the nature of their relationships in the face of changing conditions? Some of the tools developed and the paradigmatic forms of research employed in this project will be useful in providing answers to specific questions such as those posed above.

这项研究将涵盖四个具体的主题。(1)发展面对意外情况下的选择的公理模型，重点是动态选择模型和多人环境中的选择模型。目标是在决策者不确定未来可能发生什么意外情况时，建立代表理性偏好的公理，更不用说会发生什么了。(2)将分析在出现不可预见的意外情况下的有效合同形式，强调双边关系合同将如何随着双方对彼此的偏好和未来的意外情况的了解的变化而变化。(3)研究不可预见的或有事件对责任保险的影响，强调在有限责任法律面前责任保险的次佳形式。(4)将调查通过使用廉价谈话来创造不同情况之间相似的概念，即一方简单地声明一种情况与其他情况相似。问题是，这种声明什么时候会可信，这种情况是否可以通过启发式学习过程自然出现。这项研究的一个重要的总体主题，在前三个主题中比在第四个主题中更明显，即个体如何适应，平衡是在个体不断面对其先前计划没有预料到的情况的背景下构建的。这是全球以及更多地方性变化的标志；个人、经济和社会如何适应规则和条件总是变化的环境？例如，面对温室效应，对于各种行动(或不行动)的最终后果存在诚实的争议，我们应该如何处理？各国经济应该如何构建其贸易关系，在这种背景下，在双边和三边或多边合同形式之间可以做出明确的选择，不同的国家在面对不断变化的条件时，不断地确定其关系的性质？在本项目中开发的一些工具和采用的研究范例形式将有助于为上述问题等具体问题提供答案。