Design of Markets

Robept Wilson斯坦福大学SBR-9511209 该提案包括四个涉及市场设计的项目。 第一个项目涉及多项目拍卖和其他分配不可分割货物多个单位的机制的设计。 其中将解决的问题是：（一）的猜想，口头双向拍卖是一个“通用机制”，至少有一些偏好，以及（ii）一些实验拍卖的令人费解的结果建模。 第二个项目继续目前的研究由P.I.关于法律的发现的博弈论分析。 第三个项目将研究多维机制设计。 第四个项目继续目前的研究由P.I.关于扩展形式博弈的行为策略的有效计算。这将利用冯施滕格尔发现的一个计划，这是线性的信息集的数量。

Robept Wilson Stanford University SBR-9511209 The proposal consists of four projects involving the design of markets. The first project concerns the design of multi-item auctions and other mechanisms for allocating multiple units of an indivisible good. Among the issues that will be addressed are: (I) the conjecture that the oral double auction is a "universal mechanism" for at least some preferences, and (ii) the modeling of the puzzling outcomes of some experimental auctions. The second project continues current research by the P.I. on game theoretic analysis of legal discovery. The third project will study multidimensional mechanism design. The fourth project continues current research by the P.I. on the efficient computation of behavioral strategies of extensive-form games. This will make use of the discovery by von Stengel of a scheme that is linear in the number of information sets.