Design of Markets

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Robept Wilson Stanford University SBR-9511209 The proposal consists of four projects involving the design of markets. The first project concerns the design of multi-item auctions and other mechanisms for allocating multiple units of an indivisible good. Among the issues that will be addressed are: (I) the conjecture that the oral double auction is a "universal mechanism" for at least some preferences, and (ii) the modeling of the puzzling outcomes of some experimental auctions. The second project continues current research by the P.I. on game theoretic analysis of legal discovery. The third project will study multidimensional mechanism design. The fourth project continues current research by the P.I. on the efficient computation of behavioral strategies of extensive-form games. This will make use of the discovery by von Stengel of a scheme that is linear in the number of information sets.